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THE ILLUSION OF AUTONOMY IN WOMEN‘S
MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING
JAMIE R. ABRAMS
ABSTRACT
This Article considers why there is not more conflict between women and their doctors in
obstetric decision-making. While patients in every other medical context have complete autonomy to refuse treatment against medical advice, elect high-risk courses of action, and
prioritize their own interests above any other decision-making metric, childbirth is viewed
anomalously because of the duty to the fetus that the state and the doctor owe at birth. Many
feminist scholars have analyzed the complex resolution of these conflicts when they arise,
particularly when the state threatens to intervene to override the birthing woman‘s autonomy. This Article instead considers the far more common scenario when women and their
doctors align in the face of great decision-making complexity and uncertainty. What decision-making framework normalizes this doctor-patient alignment, and how does this decision-making framework complicate the actualization of autonomy for the women who do not
elect this framework? This Article concludes that many, if not most, of the four million
women who birth in hospital settings attended by physicians align with their doctors by
applying a shared decision-making framework that presumptively elects the outcome that
minimizes any, even minor, risks to the fetus. While individual patients can certainly elect
this approach autonomously, when understood in the context of tort law—in which the actions of ―most women‖ and ―most doctors‖ can become the standard of care itself—this
framework is deeply concerning.
This fetal-focused decision-making framework perpetuates an illusion of autonomy because doctors can apply the framework independently and universally. This decisionmaking model problematically resurrects the ghost of Roe v. Wade‘s medical model in which
doctors effectuate decision-making autonomy for women. Understood through a tort law
lens, while this illusion of autonomy might not seem problematic to the individual women
who elect this framework, it risks imputing a distorted standard of care to all obstetric cases
by creating a primacy that always prioritizes fetal risks over maternal risks, a primacy that
explicitly contravenes existing tort standards. Tort law ordinarily governs ―unreasonable
risks,‖ whereas this framework elevates any fetal risk to an unreasonable risk and reduces
any maternal risk short of death to reasonable. It risks imputing to all women a standard
requiring the complete acceptance of medical guidance.
This Article concludes that tort law standards should explicitly govern not just the
―what‖ of childbirth outcomes, but the ―how‖ of childbirth decision-making by using decision-making aids to ensure that women‘s autonomy is actual and not illusory. Incorporating
decision-making aids in the standard of care would remedy the illusion of autonomy by
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ensuring that ―most women‘s‖ decision-making frameworks are not presumptively applied to
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article occupies an uncomfortable, but necessary, place for
women‘s rights—it considers how ―most women‖ navigate medical
decision-making in childbirth. It considers why there is not more conflict between women and their doctors over medical decision-making
in childbirth. It does so to reveal the critical importance of the tort
law lens to actualizing women‘s birthing autonomy.
While patients in every other medical context have complete autonomy to refuse treatment against medical advice, elect high-risk
courses of action, and prioritize their own interests above any other
decision-making metric, childbirth is viewed anomalously because of
the duty to the fetus that the state and the doctor owe at birth.1 These duties have led to excessive medical interventions,2 forced medical
procedures, and criminal prosecutions against pregnant and birthing

1. See Lidia Hoffman & Monica K. Miller, Inconsistent State Court Rulings Concerning Pregnancy-Related Behaviors, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 279, 280 (2009) (explaining how the
state has a ―compelling interest‖ in protecting human life after viability).
2. See generally THE BUSINESS OF BEING BORN (New Line Home Video 2008) (depicting
the interventionist cycle of American childbirth, including labor-inducing drugs, forceps, cesarean sections, and pain medications); MARSDEN WAGNER, BORN IN THE USA: HOW A
BROKEN MATERNITY SYSTEM MUST BE FIXED TO PUT MOTHERS AND INFANTS FIRST 5 (2006)
(explaining how obstetricians ―find medical solutions to normal situations‖ in childbirth).
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women.3 Reproductive rights scholarship has defended women‘s autonomy in medical decision-making when conflicts arise between
women and their doctors,4 women and the state,5 and women and
their fetuses.6 This scholarship lens examining conflict is vital to
women‘s autonomy.7
This Article instead considers the far more common scenario when
women and their doctors align in the face of great decision-making
complexity and uncertainty. Despite historical advocacy for choice,
most women regularly enter the most expensive and interventionist
childbirth health care system in the world with great normalcy.8
Most medicalized hospital births still lack adequate informed con-

3. See, e.g., Nina Martin, A Terrifying Precedent: Woman to Be Tried for Murder for
Giving Birth to Stillborn, SALON (Mar. 22, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/22/
a_terrifying_precedent_woman_to_be_tried_for_murder_for_giving_birth_to_stillborn/ (reporting on a woman‘s prosecution for depraved heart murder after her baby was stillborn with its
cord wrapped around its neck with trace amounts of cocaine byproduct detected). See generally
Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women
in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women‘s Legal Status and Public Health,
38 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 299, 331 (2013) (chronicling the arrests and forced interventions of hundreds of pregnant women nationwide and concluding that these forced interventions are pervasive and ―raise numerous concerns about the health and dignity afforded
to pregnant women in the United States‖).
4. See generally Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors‘ Orders: Unmasking the
Doctor‘s Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 451 (2000) (explaining how conflicts between women and doctors can arise at any time from conception to
birth on issues ranging from testing to delivery methods).
5. See Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 283 (explaining how the state cannot generally require one to subordinate her rights to others, even to save a life, but pregnant
women can be compelled by the state to ―undergo a particular medical treatment [that]
conflicts with her right to self-determination and bodily integrity‖); Margo Kaplan, ―A Special Class of Persons‖: Pregnant Women‘s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales
v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 187-89 (2010) (explaining how forced medical interventions infringe on women‘s constitutional rights in ―abhorrent‖ ways because they allow
the ―state to determine for a woman what risks she must assume for the benefit of the fetus and physically appropriate[] her body to serve the state‘s interest in the fetus,‖ when
the state orders no ―similar sacrifices in the context of saving the lives of third parties‖);
Suzanne K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural Analysis of the Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (2001) (explaining how a birthing woman‘s right to informed consent
is ―balanced against state and public concerns‖).
6. See Oberman, supra note 4, at 472 (explaining how the fetus is seen as a ―second
patient who faces greater risks of serious morbidity and mortality than does the mother‖).
7. CARSON STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE 2 (1997).
8. See WAGNER, supra note 2, at 9 (concluding that Americans pay ―more per capita
for maternity services than any other country in the world‖); RICHARD W.
WERTZ & DOROTHY C. WERTZ, LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 63, 141
(1977) (explaining the historically interventionist role that doctors have played in childbirth); Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World, N.Y. TIMES
(June
30,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/health/american-way-of-birthcostliest-in-the-world.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining the ―sticker shock‖ American
women experience where charges for childbirth have tripled since 1996).
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sent9 and are largely uncontested by the four million women who give
birth in this manner each year.10 From a tort law lens, the birthing
experience of ―most women‖ greatly influences the governing standard of care applied to all women and is therefore a critical unexamined site for study.
What decision-making framework normalizes the frequency of
doctor-patient alignment in obstetric care, and how does this decision-making framework complicate the actualization of autonomy for
the women who do not elect this framework? This Article concludes
that many women align with their doctors by applying a decisionmaking framework that always seeks to reduce all risks to the fetus
regardless of maternal risks or materiality.11
This decision-making framework might actualize the autonomy of
the women who elect this approach, but it perpetuates an illusion of
autonomy that is problematic to the women who do not elect this
framework.12 This illusion of autonomy resurrects the ghost of Roe v.
Wade‘s medical model, in which doctors effectuate decision-making
autonomy for women.13 Understood in a tort lens, this illusion of autonomy risks imputing a distorted standard of care to all obstetric
cases by creating a primacy that always prioritizes fetal risks over
maternal risks regardless of likelihood or severity, a primacy that is
explicitly inconsistent with existing tort standards.14 Tort law ordinarily governs ―unreasonable risks,‖ whereas this framework elevates any fetal risk to an unreasonable risk and reduces any maternal risk short of death to reasonable.15 It risks imputing to all women
a standard that their autonomy is presumptively exercised by the
complete acceptance of medical guidance.16
This Article concludes that tort law standards should explicitly
govern not just the ―what‖ of childbirth outcomes, but the ―how‖ of
childbirth decision-making by using decision-making aids to ensure
9. Numerous feminist scholars and historians have chronicled and analyzed the absence of meaningful informed consent in childbirth interventions. Proper informed consent
requires presenting the birthing woman with alternatives and medically accurate and
complete information, including risks to the birthing woman, not just those to the fetus.
See, e.g., Ketler, supra note 5, at 1031 (explaining that ―the doctrine of informed consent
was founded upon the notion that adult persons have a fundamental right to bodily selfdetermination‖).
10. See, e.g., PHYLLIS L. BRODSKY, THE CONTROL OF CHILDBIRTH: WOMEN VERSUS
MEDICINE THROUGH THE AGES 7-9 (2008) (explaining how a ―doctor knows best‖ attitude
prevails in childbirth).
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. See infra Parts IV–V.
13. See infra Part VI.C.
14. See infra Parts VI.A–B.
15. See infra Part VI.A.
16. See infra Part VI.B.
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that women‘s autonomy is actual and not illusory.17 Incorporating
decision-making aids in the standard of care would remedy the illusion of autonomy by ensuring that ―most women‘s‖ decision-making
frameworks are not presumptively applied to all women so as to distort tort law and undermine patient autonomy.
II. NORMALCY AND CONFORMITY DOMINATE CHILDBIRTH
Despite the propensity for conflict and difference that childbirth
seems to present,18 childbirth today is pervasively medicalized, hospitalized, and intervention-oriented.19
A. The Normalized Medical Interventionist Model
Despite choice in birth methods,20 modern childbirth remains
heavily normalized around a medicalized and intervention-oriented
model. A survey on Listening to Mothers II considered women‘s experiences with hospital births and concluded that ―labor is literally
pushed by routine or common measures‖ upon healthy populations
through labor induction, augmentation, and direction, and it is also
―pulled by interventions such as vacuum extraction/forceps, cesarean
section, pulling on the cord to hasten birth of the placenta, and separation of babies from mothers after birth.‖21
Modern childbirth is ―almost always‖ in a hospital.22 It is the leading cause of hospitalization today.23 Only 33,043 babies are born at
home for every four million births in hospitals,24 while 98.7% of all
17. See infra Part VI.
18. Adele E. Laslie, Ethical Issues in Childbirth, 7 J. MED. & PHIL. 179, 181 (1982)
(noting that this normalcy has been criticized for ―imposing one model of treatment and
care on individuals in widely differing circumstances,‖ yet conformity persists).
19. Advocates have sought to de-medicalize childbirth, but this view has not prevailed
pervasively. DEBORAH LUPTON, MEDICINE AS CULTURE: ILLNESS, DISEASE AND THE BODY
154 (3d ed. 2012).
20. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice That Should
Be Supported, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345 (2008) (highlighting birthing choices).
21. Carol Sakala & Maureen P. Corry, Evidence-Based Maternity Care: What It Is and
What It Can Achieve, MILBANK MEM‘L FUND 28 (2008), available at
http://www.childbirthconnection.org/pdfs/evidence-based-maternity-care.pdf.
22. Laslie, supra note 18, at 185.
23. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that six of the fifteen most common
hospital procedures are related to childbirth).
24. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2011, 62 NAT‘L VITAL STAT. REP. 1,
51 (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01.pdf. However,
some data positively suggest that the number of home births is increasing. Id. at 10 (indicating that ―[t]he number of births occurring at home (33,043) [in 2011] was the highest
since reporting began for this item in 1989‖ and that the number of out-of-hospital births
attended by Certified Nurse Midwives also rose by 6% from 28.6% in 2005 to 30.2% in
2011); see also BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 177 (noting that the incidents of fetal death are
identical in hospital and home deliveries).
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babies are born in hospitals.25 This is a marked historical shift within
the last century.26
Modern childbirth is routinely overseen by physicians. Obstetricians hold a virtual ―monopoly . . . over the maternity care system.‖27
Of modern hospital births, 86.1% are performed by doctors of medicine, 7.6% by nurse midwives, and 5.8% by doctors of osteopathy.28
The medicalization of childbirth has dramatically exaggerated the
role of doctors in birthing care and entrenched it.29 This is a modern
continuation of ―heroic‖ medicine traditions whereby physicians supplanted midwives and treated pregnancy with increasingly interventionist measures.30
The rate of cesarean section births in the United States is particularly normalized. The rate of cesarean sections rose every year from
1996 to 2009, including a single year increase of seven percent.31 Although the use of cesarean deliveries seems to have remained steady
in recent years, the procedure accounted for 32.8% of all registered
births in the United States during 2011.32 About one in three babies
is delivered by cesarean section today compared to one in five babies
in 1996.33 With the increased cesarean rate comes the increased risks
25. Martin et al., supra note 24, at 10.
26. In 1900, ―less than 5% of women delivered in the hospital.‖ WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 8, at 133. In 1940, fifty-five percent of births were in hospital settings, and by
1960, eighty-eight percent were in hospital settings. JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, BROUGHT TO
BED: CHILDBEARING IN AMERICA 1750 TO 1950, at 171 (1986). Generally, the non-hospital
births were in rural areas. Id.
27. See, e,g., WAGNER, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that obstetricians oversee ninety
percent of American births and maintain a ―monopoly . . . over the maternity care system,‖
while comparatively midwives oversee seventy-five percent of births in industrialized
Western countries like Australia, Netherlands, and Great Britain). ―[H]aving an obstetrical
surgeon manage a normal birth is like having a pediatric surgeon babysit a normal twoyear-old.‖ Id. at 5.
28. Martin et al., supra note 24, at 10. Notably, the number of hospital births attended by certified nurse midwives in 2011 reflects a six percent increase since 2005. Id. This
increase also applies to the number of births attended by certified nurse midwives outside
of the hospital. Id.
29. WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 8, at 141 (―By 1920 doctors believed that ‗normal‘
deliveries . . . were so rare as to be virtually nonexistent.‖).
30. BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHES, MIDWIVES, AND NURSES: A
HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS 23-24, 28-30 (1973) (documenting the class distinctions of
this transition whereby upper-class women first used physicians as medical attendants).
Today there are approximately 5700 working nurse midwives in the United States. U.S.
DEP‘T OF LABOR, BUR. OF STAT., OCCUPATIONAL EMP‘T & WAGES, MAY 2012: 29-1161 NURSE
MIDWIVES, available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/2012/may/oes291161.htm.
31. Martin et al., supra note 24, at 10. In 2011, vaginal deliveries constituted
2,651,428 of the 3,953,590 registered births in the United States. Id. at 52.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Shankar Vedantam, Money May Be Motivating Doctors to Do More C-Sections,
NPR (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/08/30/216479305/money-maybe-motivating-doctors-to-do-more-c-sections; see also Erin M. Johnson & M. Marit Rehavi,
Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth 2-3 (NBER
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of health complications to women. As major abdominal surgery,
cesarean births increase risks of infection and recovery complications
to women.34
Modern childbirth is almost universally reliant on medical interventions.35 Childbirth was historically a ―natural‖ event.36 Doctors
transformed childbirth over time into a series of ―more precise and
effective manipulations and interventions, both to prevent and to
cure disease‖ which ensured that doctors were ―on the lookout for trouble in birth.‖37 Modern birth is viewed as ―something that cannot be left
alone, that must be interfered with, monitored and ‗helped along.‘ ‖38
Modern birth is heavily managed in its timing and pacing. It is
characterized by the frequent artificial rupturing of the water, inducement and augmentation of labor, and managed pain treatment.39
Labor induction is the ―use of drugs and/or techniques to cause labor
to start, as opposed to waiting for labor to begin on its own through a
complex interplay of maternal and fetal factors.‖40 The percentage of
medically induced labors rose by 135% from 9.5% to 22.3% between
1990 and 2005.41 This has in turn contributed to earlier gestational

Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 19242, 2013), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19242 (noting variability in cesarean rates across states from
22.6% in Alaska to 39.7% in Louisiana).
34. Johnson & Rehavi, supra note 33, at 8. See generally Sakala & Corry, supra note
21, at 44 (describing the numerous adverse health complications of cesarean delivery).
35. See, e.g., Peter B. Angood et al., Blueprint for Action: Steps Toward a HighQuality, High-Value Maternity Care System, 20 WOMEN‘S HEALTH ISSUES S18, S24 (2010).
Women‘s accounts of childbirth in the hospital revealed the use of Oxytocin to speed labor
fifty-seven percent of the time, the rupturing of the membrane sixty-five percent of the
time, the use of epidurals in seventy-six percent of births, the administration of IVs in
eighty-three percent of births, the cathertization of the bladder in fifty-six percent of
births, the use of forceps in seven percent of births, and cesarean deliveries in thirty-two
percent of births (sixteen percent for first-time births and sixteen percent for repeat
births). Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 27.
36. BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 11 (explaining how in ancient times women‘s bodies
were more physically fit and prepared for the task of childbirth, and they birthed smaller
babies); WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 8, at 141 (noting that one Boston doctor in 1923 urged
women to redefine birth ―not as ‗something natural and normal, and not worth the time of
obstetricians and specialists‘ charges,‘ but as ‗a complicated and delicately adjusted process, subject to variations from the normal which may be disastrous to the mother or baby,
or both‘ ‖); Ellen S. Lazarus, What Do Women Want? Issues of Choice, Control, and Class in
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 8 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 25, 27 (1994).
37. WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 8, at 136.
38. LUPTON, supra note 19, at 153.
39. BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 142-43 (noting that epidurals were used in at least
ninety percent of all medical deliveries in the 1980s).
40. Sakala & Corry, supra note 23, at 35-37 (including breaking the membrane and
using drugs).
41. Id. at 16 (noting that these validation studies suggest that these rates only identify 45-61% of the induced labor).
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births for singleton babies from an average of forty gestational weeks
to thirty-nine gestational weeks.42
Some women are requesting cesareans and inductions from their
doctors independently.43 Many others are undergoing these interventions without adequate informed consent at their doctor‘s direction.44
In the Listening to Mothers II survey of childbirth in U.S. hospitals,
forty-one percent of women said that a health professional suggested
inducing labor in eighty-four percent of the cases, and a total of thirty-four percent of the respondents actually had a medically induced
labor.45 Eleven percent of the respondents ―felt pressure‖ to induce.46
Fetal monitoring technology has become standardized too. It is the
most common obstetrical procedure performed in the United States.47
While fetal monitoring technology emerged and garnered acceptance
in the 1960s,48 it was originally used only for high-risk pregnancies.49
Today, electronic fetal monitoring technology ―is the standard of care
in virtually every community,‖50 despite persistent questions regarding its reliability and concerns regarding its basis for medicalized interventions.51 Approximately eighty-five percent of all annual births
in the United States use electronic fetal monitoring.52

42. Id.
43. See Chris McCourt et al., Elective Cesarean Section and Decision Making: A Critical Review of the Literature, 34 BIRTH 65, 65 (2007) (identifying convenience, patient
choice, and psychological factors, especially concerning negative experiences in prior childbirths and fear relating to childbirth, the perceived safety of a cesarean, and social and
cultural factors).
44. ―It is dubious that women have been sufficiently informed about the possible risks
associated with artificial stimulation of labor, including over-stimulating the uterus, fetal
distress, more painful contractions, and the cascade of procedures that may follow.‖
BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 143.
45. Sakala & Corry, supra note 23, at 36.
46. Id. at 37, 44 (listing consequences and side effects associated with inducing labor).
47. Thomas P. Sartwelle, Electronic Fetal Monitoring: A Bridge Too Far, 33 J. LEGAL
MED. 313, 313 (2012).
48. Id.
49. ANGELA DAVIS, MODERN MOTHERHOOD: WOMEN AND FAMILY IN ENGLAND, C. 19452000, at 85 (Lynn Abrams et al. eds., 2012).
50. Sartwelle, supra note 47, at 313.
51. SHEILA KITZINGER, THE POLITICS OF BIRTH 46, 91 (2005); Sartwelle, supra note 47,
at 313-14 (―[I]ts scientific foundation is feeble; inter-observer/intra-observer reliability is
poor; the false-positive prediction of fetal distress rate is greater than ninety-nine percent;
it has substantially increased the cesarean section rate with attendant mortality and morbidity; and it failed completely in its initial stated promise—reducing by half the incidence
of cerebral palsy (CP), mental retardation (MR), and perinatal mortality.‖).
52. Sartwelle, supra note 47, at 313; see also Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 27
(noting that women‘s own accounts reveal a seventy-one percent usage of ―continuous‖ fetal
monitoring and another sixteen percent usage ―most‖ of the time).
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And most of these interventions occur without proper informed
consent.53 Doctors readily acknowledge informed consent models governing childbirth and pregnancy are different because of the treatment of the woman and the fetus.54 ―Most of the time, medical interventions are employed without considering the woman‘s choice or obtaining informed consent‖; women merely sign a general permission
of care form upon admission.55 Many women assume that the frequency and regularity of these interventions means that they are always in their best interest, unaware that ―they may be exposed to
avoidable and potentially harmful interventions . . . because of a lack
of transparent comparative performance data to guide decisions and
limited access to some effective high-value alternatives.‖56 Women
report wishing they knew more about the risks and side effects of these procedures.57 The pace of labor can complicate informed consent.
Women report feeling dependent in labor on health professionals to
make effective decisions ―about which tests or procedures were in fact
intrusive.‖58
And these interventions are heavily interconnected. ―As one intervention justifies or increases the likelihood of using others, the cumulative effect is to create a distorted understanding of childbirth as a
time when things are likely to go wrong and intensive medical management is required.‖59 These interventions disrupt the natural process
of birth and ―incur a cascade of secondary interventions used to monitor, prevent, and treat the side effects of the initial interventions.‖60
These interventions are normalized and costly even though they
may not conform to the standard of care. The medical costs of child53. See, e.g., BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 142-43 (contesting the ―informed consent
model‖ governing the doctor-patient relationship in childbirth); Ketler, supra note 5, at
1033 (explaining how underlying presumptions in historic cases position birthing women
as ―incompetent, irrational, ruled by nature, and therefore unable to make informed decisions‖ and noting that even modern cases position women as vulnerable and weak); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95
YALE L.J. 219, 221 (1985).
54. Oberman, supra note 4, at 472. See generally Pamela Harris, Compelled Medical
Treatment of Pregnant Women: The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 133, 134 (2001) (noting how informed consent is believed to be more complicated in
childbirth because of the fetus).
55. BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 166; see also KITZINGER, supra note 51, at 46, 91; Andrew Iverson Almand, Note, A Mother‘s Worst Nightmare, What‘s Left Unsaid: The Lack of
Informed Consent in Obstetrical Practices, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 565, 593 (2012)
(―Why are such seemingly material risks of drugs and procedures unconscionably being
withheld from expectant mothers by obstetricians? Without a doubt, every mother would
expect to be told the preceding information, yet so few actually receive it.‖).
56. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S25.
57. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 66.
58. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 37.
59. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 28.
60. Id.
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birth have risen by $3 billion annually from 1996 to 2009.61 Costs are
particularly high for interventionist childbirths in hospital settings.62
Yet, critically, these interventions are not achieving better outcomes.
The United States spends far more on medicalized childbirth, yet
lags behind many countries in key indicators.63 The U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services‘ Healthy People 2010 report found
that the United States is moving away from healthy birth weight
targets and experiencing a rise in maternal mortality rates.64 This is
particularly so for women of color and lower-income women.65 And
women are having more physical and mental problems immediately
after birth.66
―Most women‖ experience a medicalized birth in a hospital setting
with sub-standard informed consent. To the extent that maternaldoctor alignments are normalized within certain patterns, this raises
the question of which cultural norms are being endorsed and sustained.67 Lisa Ikemoto explained this powerfully as the ―Code of Perfect Pregnancy,‖ where essentialism prevails and acts to
direct the power of the state at women along race, class, and culture lines in the name of ―protecting fetal interests.‖ The resulting
narrow standard . . . has an effect beyond that of taking from
women the authority to construct pregnancy and motherhood for
themselves; it also eliminates the possibility of difference.68

61. Vedantam, supra note 33 (noting how obstetricians may be paid more for cesarean
sections).
62. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 15, 47 (explaining that the average charge in
2005 ranged from $7000 for uncomplicated vaginal deliveries to $16,000 for complicated
cesarean deliveries and that non-hospital births averaged $1624).
63. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S24 (―The United States spends far more than all
other countries on health care, yet lags behind many on currently available global maternal and newborn indicators.‖). Maternal and newborn hospital charges totaled $86 billion
in 2006, far exceeding those of any other hospital condition. Id.
64. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 3. The World Health Organization reports that
twenty-nine nations have better rates for maternal mortality in childbirth, thirty-five nations have better rates for neonatal mortality, and twenty-three nations have lower rates of
low birth weight births than the United States. Id. at 17 (reporting 2005 data for mortality
rates and 2003 data for low birth weights).
65. See, e.g., Angood et al., supra note 35, at S27 (noting particularly that black, nonHispanic women were increasing in negative health statistics for neonatal deaths, low
birth weight infants, and other negative birthing outcomes).
66. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 16 (indicating that women birthing in hospitals
in 2005 reported high rates of new-onset physical and mental problems in the first two
months after birth, with many problems persisting to six months or more postpartum).
67. See EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 30, at 28-30 (documenting the class distinctions of pregnancy).
68. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology
of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of
Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1208 (1992).
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The relative normalcy of a dominant birthing experience therefore
bears further examination.
B. The Propensity for Frequent Conflict
The uniqueness of obstetric care would seem to present the opportunity for more conflict.69 It is one of the only medical contexts in
which a doctor considers possible liability to two potential litigants—
the fetus and the birthing woman—and in which the state has expressed a clear interest and willingness to intervene.70
Typical obstetric care involves a series of decisions made with imperfect information surrounding the simultaneous health risks facing
both the fetus and the birthing woman.71 Obstetric decisions frequently involve medical considerations that threaten or invoke both
the health of the pregnant woman and the fetus.72 These decisions
include cesarean delivery or vaginal labor, electronic fetal monitoring, responses to breech positions, vaginal births after cesarean sections, and choice of pain management.73
Obstetric medicine is an imperfect, judgment-based practice that
responds to uncertainty.74 It relies heavily on science and skill, but at
bottom, doctors are acting with informed judgment in resolving conflicts involving some degree of uncertainty.75 There is little consensus
within the medical community regarding which services are essential
to maternal care and which interventions actually improve health
outcomes, which should cause more variation in medical decisionmaking.76 Even where there is medical consensus, that consensus
does not necessarily match the realities of the medical care that is
69. See MANUAL OF OBSTETRICS 404 (Arthur T. Evans & Kenneth R. Niswander eds.,
6th ed. 2000) (explaining that the ―[m]anagement of labor should achieve delivery in a reasonable period of time while providing maternal support and avoiding any significant compromise to the mother or fetus‖).
70. See generally Harris, supra note 54, at 158 (explaining that ―[a]s this idea of maternal tort liability grows, a pregnant woman‘s choices diminish and the state begins to
play a role in her pregnancy‖).
71. See Oberman, supra note 4, at 451 (explaining how conflicts between women and
doctors can arise at any time from conception to birth on issues ranging from testing to
delivery methods).
72. CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN‘S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF
FETAL RIGHTS 3, 42 (1993).
73. Law, supra note 20, at 366.
74. See KATHRYN MONTGOMERY, HOW DOCTORS THINK 3 (2006) (explaining how doctors draw on skill as well as judgment in making decisions).
75. Id. (noting how medical education teaches what is ―known‖ in medicine and then
the clinical apprenticeship prepares doctors to act in response to the uncertainty).
76. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S34 (documenting a ―lack of consensus on a comprehensive package of essential maternity services that have been shown to improve health
outcomes, and should be covered by public and private insurance,‖ which leads to ―unwarranted variation in maternity care‖).
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provided. Some ―[p]ractices that are disproved or appropriate for
mothers and babies in limited circumstances are in wide use, and
beneficial practices are underused.‖77
This variation in best practices should lead to more variety of patient choice. There are choices available, women are competent to
make the choices, and ―reasonable professionals, and hence reasonable patients, disagree‖ about which options are best.78 Literature
available to birthing women describing the range of childbirth and
child rearing perspectives also offer competing, even contradictory,
theories that would suggest more disagreement or conflict to be resolved in doctor-patient relationships.79 Given the individuality of
birth, the range of options and choices presented, and the lack of
medical consensus in standards of care, why then is there not more
conflict or disagreement between doctors and birthing women?
C. The Relative Normalcy of Alignment and
Absence of Conflict
Yet, but for a few iconic cases,80 very few women actually sue or
explicitly challenge this medicalized, interventionist model of childbirth.81 ―Most women‖ do not explicitly object to these interventions
contemporaneously or retroactively. Rather, women‘s accounts of
hospitalized childbirth and medicalized childbirth ―indicate[] that
they had a rather ambivalent response to‖ the hospitalization and
medicalization itself.82 While ― ‗some women are alienated by their
experience of medicali[z]ed birth,‘ ‖ many women across social classes
77. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 1. ―Many maternity practices that were originally developed to address specific problems have come to be used liberally and even routinely in healthy women‖; these practices include labor induction, epidural analgesia, and
cesarean sections. Id. at 4. ―Available systematic reviews also do not support the routine
use of other common maternity practices, including numerous prenatal tests and treatments, continuous electronic fetal monitoring, rupturing membranes during labor, and
episiotomy.‖ Id.
78. Law, supra note 20, at 366.
79. See DAVIS, supra note 49, at 114 (noting the ―tensions, ambiguities, and indeed the
contradictions that are present in the women‘s accounts‖ of caring for children).
80. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem‘l Reg‘l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d
1247, 1249 (N.D. Fla. 1999); Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983, 991 (D.C. 2010) (―Of
course, [the doctor] could not ‗order‘ surgery without the patient‘s consent.‖); Ketler, supra
note 5 (examining patient control and autonomy in labor and birth).
81. See Jamie R. Abrams, Distorted and Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1955 (2013) (concluding that women rarely sue for birthing harms); see
also David M. Engel, Perception and Decision at the Threshold of Tort Law: Explaining the
Infrequency of Claims, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 293-94 (concluding that fewer than one in
fourteen personal injury victims consults a lawyer, only one in fifty sues, and nine out of
ten never contact injurer or insurance company of injurer). Sparse tort literature considers
why this is so, although speculation considers money, time, and aggravation as possible
explanations. Id. at 294.
82. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 107.
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welcome medical intervention, if not management, and are quite satisfied with hospital deliveries.83 Women‘s interviews describing epidural anesthesia and caesarean sections, for example, are not described as ―turning points‖ in labor, but rather ―just another procedure undergone.‖84
In the relatively rare cases when doctors and birthing women conflict in decision-making, the results of judicial intervention have been
notably mixed and inconsistent.85 Where conflicts do arise, occasionally courts resolve the dispute between the birthing woman‘s selected
course of action and the doctor‘s recommended course of action.86
Some courts have held that women‘s decision-making autonomy is
absolute, while others have said that the rights of the fetus or the
state override her rights.87 This uncertainty—particularly when it
derives from high-profile cases—emphasizes a divide, which leaves
women with little clarity regarding their birthing rights.88 The law
certainly recognizes a strong presumption in favor of maternal autonomy, but that autonomy is far from absolute.89 The inconsistency
83. TINA MILLER, MAKING SENSE OF MOTHERHOOD, A NARRATIVE APPROACH 31, 73
(2005) (quoting Bonny Fox & Diana Worts, Revisiting the Critique of Medicalized Childbirth: A Contribution to the Sociology of Birth, 13 GENDER & SOC‘Y 326, 328 (1999)).
[W]omen ―regardless of social class or ethnicity . . . spoke about childbirth as a
natural process, but at least to some degree, they accepted the medical view of
birth: that any number of things could go wrong and that ultimately they had
to rely on authoritative knowledge and concomitant technological expertise of
their physician to ensure that they had done everything possible to have a
healthy baby.‖
Id. at 73 (quoting Ellen Lazarus, What Do Women Want? Issues of Choice, Control, and
Class in American Pregnancy and Childbirth, in CHILDBIRTH AND AUTHORITATIVE
KNOWLEDGE: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 132, 133 (Robbie E. Davis-Floyd & Carolyn
F. Sargent eds., 1997)). That is certainly not to say that women are universally happy with
their birthing experiences. Women do state that they want more information and they are
not always happy with the relationships underlying the care they are given, a point that
might ordinarily increase the likelihood for suit. Angela Davis‘s account in Modern Motherhood explains that women surveyed about their birthing experiences did ―often report[]
their unhappiness with obstetric interventions,‖ but she concludes that this was ―as much
a criticism of the lack of information they received, the lack of choice they felt that they
had in their care, and their dissatisfaction with their medical attendants (doctors, midwives, and nurses), as their dislike of the procedures themselves.‖ DAVIS, supra note 49, at
107. Women might report that they received ―excellent medical care‖ overall but still criticize the interpersonal treatment they received from hospital staff. Id.
84. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 98.
85. See Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 280 (concluding that ―[d]ifferent state
courts have issued many competing decisions, which emphasizes a lack of unification in
this area of law‖).
86. Oberman, supra note 4, at 451.
87. Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 288.
88. Id. at 289.
89. See, e.g., STRONG, supra note 7, at 183. The author concludes as follows:
The bodily integrity of mentally competent individuals who are persons in the
descriptive sense is an extremely important ethical value. Control over one‘s
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itself creates ―confusion for women concerning the scope of their legal
protections.‖90
Constitutional approaches addressing women‘s decision-making
autonomy and state interventions do not translate effectively into the
private clinical setting of obstetric medical care.91 Nor have constitutional frameworks yielded consistent outcomes. Even cases that are
deeply enshrined as beacons of patient autonomy, such as Schreiber
v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin,92 do not provide workable
guidelines explaining when doctors should follow maternal decisionmaking and when they can override it.93
This inconsistency and lack of clarity, however, has not necessitated or yielded any explicit tort standard or medical standard to address the anomalous nature of childbirth. At the moment of birth,
doctors owe a duty of care to both the birthing woman and the fetus,
and the doctor can be sued by either.94 Nowhere in tort literature or
precedent is the complexity of childbirth decision-making fleshed out
in a primacy lens clarifying how doctors should respond if these duties conflict.95 Nowhere in tort literature or precedent is a workable
methodology presented for resolving disputes that might arise from
decision-making conflict between the woman‘s autonomy and her
doctor‘s duty to the fetus in birth, revealing the relative normalcy of
alignments and rarity of conflict.
Likewise obstetric training texts generally make no mention
whatsoever of the possibility of conflict or resolution of it, further
supporting the normalcy of alignment and rarity of conflict. For example, Williams‘ Obstetrics text, a leading text in obstetric practice,

body is a crucial aspect of self-determination. Only the most compelling of reasons
would justify a significant violation of the physical integrity of a person‘s body.
Id. at 180.
90. Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 280.
91. See STRONG, supra note 7, at 4-6 (describing a disconnect between clinical approaches and policy frameworks); WENDY SIMONDS ET AL., LABORING ON: BIRTH IN
TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES (2007) (explaining how doctors in a practice group setting often do not know the birthing preferences of patients at delivery).
92. 588 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. 1999).
93. Ketler, supra note 5, at 1054 (―Furthermore, Schreiber fails to give physicians any
guideline whatsoever about where their duty to renegotiate informed consent ends.‖).
94. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (concluding that
doctors owe a duty of care to the fetus). Precisely when that duty begins and how it might
change throughout the course of the pregnancy is not clearly defined in tort law.
95. For example, the Restatement of Torts likewise is silent on these issues. There is
no positioning of obstetric care in any way as anything different than general medical malpractice claims. There is no description of the dual duties owed or the tort complexities
raised. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 37.
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makes no mention of conflicting duties or potential ethical conflicts
that may arise between women and their doctors.96 Foundations of
Maternal & Pediatric Nursing, a foundational text used to train students in maternal and pediatric nursing, says nothing whatsoever
about the distinction or complexities of managing two duties at birth
and the conflicts this might present.97 In Charles R.B. Beckmann et
al.‘s Obstetrics and Gynecology, there is a general statement that the
rights of the woman and the fetus create ethical considerations that a
doctor must resolve, but no guidance about how to resolve issues.98
And this is not occurring regularly in clinical instruction either. Rather, ―little time is spent in resident programs in medical specialties
on bioethics, informed consent, professional responsibility, and communicating with patients.‖99
Modern birth is extremely normalized toward the alignment of
women and their doctors. The question then becomes, what decisionmaking framework are women and doctors applying to yield this
alignment?
III. HOW ―MOST WOMEN‖ MAKE DECISIONS IN CHILDBIRTH
This section considers possible explanations for the normalcy of
maternal-doctor alignments in obstetric decision-making. It first
highlights briefly the existing accounts of women‘s decision-making
in childbirth. It then concludes that a shared framework in which
women and doctors align to focus on the minimization of all fetal risks
accounts for much of women‘s alignment with their doctors. The remainder of this Article will consider the implications of this fetal-focus.
A. Existing Accounts of Decision-Making in Childbirth
One explanation for the normalcy of women-doctor alignments is
that it reflects the ongoing subordination of women. Theories reflecting the subordination of women in reproduction are well documented
in feminist scholarship and women‘s history. This explanation defines women‘s subordination by their reproductive function.100 Innumerable historical examples exist of childbirth as subordination, par-

96. F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS (23d ed. 2010).
97. LOIS WHITE, GENA DUNCAN & WENDY BAUMLE, FOUNDATIONS OF
MATERNAL & PEDIATRIC NURSING (3d ed. 2011).
98. CHARLES R. B. BECKMANN ET AL., OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 25 (6th ed. 2010).
99. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 41.
100. See generally ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 175 (1986) (explaining how ―Eve‘s
curse‖ creates a ―social victimization of women-as-mothers‖).

32

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:17

ticularly as birth moved into hospitals and during the ―Twilight
Sleep‖ movement.101
The reproductive subordination of women has particularly targeted women of color and poor women.102 Powerful historical accounts
exist of doctors forcing and coercing sterilizations on poor women.103
Lynn Paltrow‘s modern pioneering work documents the race and
class distinctions of forced interventions today. She concludes that
―low-income women and women of color, especially African American
women, are overrepresented among those who have been arrested or
subjected to equivalent deprivations of liberty.‖104 Fifty-nine percent
of the forced interventions were on women of color and seventy-one
percent were on economically disadvantaged women.105
Modern reproduction subordination is less about women‘s subordination to doctors and more about women‘s subordination to their
fetuses.106 The fetus is ―the newest ‗social actor‘ in the American conservative imagination.‖107 Some modern political framings have posi101. Hospital births and professionalized medicine distinctly shifted the balance of
power, pushing out women‘s domestic support systems. See LEAVITT, supra note 26, at 181,
190. In the mid-nineteenth century obstetric care model, women were ―willingly submitting
their bodies to their physicians without questioning,‖ and ―[i]nstead of women birthing
their babies, their babies were ‗delivered‘ from them.‖ BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 7-8. In
the ―Twilight Sleep‖ movement characterized by the heavy use of sedatives, women were
―knocked out while their babies were ‗dragged out‘ ‖ by obstetricians, and their babies were
born ―floppy,‖ ―sedated,‖ and difficult to be stimulated. Id.
102. See generally SIMONE M. CARON, WHO CHOOSES? (2008) (chronicling the troubling
history of racialized interventions in the reproductive choices of the poor and of AfricanAmerican women); DANIELS, supra note 72, at 53 (concluding that women of color or in
lower economic status are ―more likely to be subject to forced medical treatments‖);
DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RECREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 102 (2011) (chronicling how medical stereotyping leads to unequal access to high quality medical care and concluding that ―[b]lacks
are less likely to get desirable medical interventions and more likely to get undesirable
interventions that good medical care would avoid‖); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Autonomy Suspended: Using Female Patients to Teach Intimate Exams Without Their Knowledge or Consent, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL‘Y, 240, 263 (2005) (describing the performance of intimate
exams on patients absent full consent as a phenomenon that has ―short-circuited the ethical sensitivity of many medical educators, who clutch to a variety of rationales for dispensing with the simple step of disclosing forthrightly the educational nature of practice procedures and asking permission‖).
103. CARON, supra note 102, at 213-14 (describing a high-profile account of Carol
Brown, a woman in South Carolina who was pregnant with her fifth child and could not
find a doctor in her town to deliver her baby unless she agreed to forced sterilization).
104. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 3, at 300-01 (examining more than four hundred
cases of arrests, detentions and forced interventions in forty-four states from 1973 to 2005).
105. Id. at 311.
106. See DANIELS, supra note 72, at 49 (explaining how physicians and hospital administrators have become ―much more inclined to compromise the patient‘s right to autonomy
in the interests of fetal health,‖ and they ―lean heavily in favor of forced medical treatment‖ under the guise of ― ‗sav[ing]‘ fetal life‖).
107. Id. at 3, 9 (explaining that this political framing emerged in the 1980s from a convergence of ―cultural, political, legal, and technological developments,‖ which collectively
brought ―the fetus into the public consciousness as an independent and autonomous being‖).
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tioned the fetus as ― ‗housed‘ inside the pregnant woman‘s body‖ in
which it can become ―victimized by the woman‘s neglect, ignorance,
or abuse.‖108 This fetal characterization ― ‗reduces women to incubators‘ who are seen not as ‗full-fledged human beings, but merely better or worse vessels for fetuses.‘ ‖109 Certainly subordination still exists, yet this account cannot fully explain the normalcy of alignment
in decision-making because it fails to account for increased women‘s
autonomy, and it needs to contemplate changing political and social
conceptions of the fetus.
On the other extreme, is some measure of the normalcy of womendoctor alignments explained by the success of the women‘s movement
and consumer health movement securing women‘s decision-making
autonomy? Doctor-patient relationships were historically more paternalistic, particularly in childbirth.110 Activists successfully challenged this model of care in the 1970s and strengthened women‘s active decision-making through informed consent.111 The ―authoritarian
physicians‖ of times past are being replaced by ―doctors who enthusiastically support, or at least accept, the self-motivated patients who
seek out information for themselves.‖112 Indeed, ―[r]espect for auton108. Id. at 28 (explaining how conservative politics have depicted the fetus as the ―victim‖ of women‘s ―excesses and freedoms‖); LUPTON, supra note 19, at 166 (―The pregnant
woman is increasingly portrayed as separate to and the adversary of her own pregnancy/fetus, by presenting a ‗hostile‘ maternal environment or refusing proposed medical
intervention.‖).
109. Linda Greenhouse, Should a Fetus‘s Well-Being Override a Mother‘s Rights?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/09/arts/should-a-fetus-s-well-beingoverride-a-mother-s-rights.html?pagewanted=print.
110. See MARTIN L. PERNOLL, BENSON AND PERNOLL‘S HANDBOOK OF
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1 (10th ed. 2001) (noting that ―the paternalistic care model,‖
which gave the physician the right to determine how much information a patient received
about her condition and possible treatments, is ―waning‖); Law, supra note 20, at 363-64
(describing how ―[t]raditions of paternalism and disrespect for patient choice‖ permeated
the childbirth experience as women‘s care became routine in hospitalized settings by the
1950s, historically including sedation, removal by forceps, episiotomies to facilitate the
forceps, and restraints).
111. See generally Holly Goldberg, Informed Decision Making in Maternity Care, 18 J.
PERINATAL EDUC. 32, 34 (2009).
112. RIMA D. APPLE, PERFECT MOTHERHOOD: SCIENCE AND CHILDREARING IN AMERICA
161 (2006). Apple cautions, however, that ―we must be careful not to romanticize this modern partnership of mother and physician.‖ Id. at 168. It has ―created a new clinical world
for both patient and doctor, a world in which there are no simple rules or procedures. Cooperation between mothers and experts should be our goal. But it will not be easy to attain.‖ Id. This success story explanation might be further supported by the increased role
of women in obstetric care and the role of choice in health services as women ―shop around‖
for the ―right doctor.‖ MILLER, supra note 83, at 74, 77-78 (describing how women‘s narrative accounts position the selection of hospitals, doctors, and pain relief protocols as means
of gaining or retaining control). But see ANN BOULIS & JERRY A. JACOBS, THE CHANGING
FACE OF MEDICINE: WOMEN DOCTORS AND THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA
152 (2008) (concluding that ―although differences in practice styles between male and female physicians exist . . . [s]ocial and structural factors will ultimately restrict such gender-linked differences‖). Women are actively seeking out hospitals and doctors in ways that
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omy has become the dominant and controlling principle in both informed consent law and medical ethics.‖113 Modern women‘s relationships with their medical experts are normatively framed more as a
partnership, ―albeit an unequal partnership,‖ whereby women work
with their medical caregivers and, in turn, practitioners seek to understand their patients‘ needs and encourage patients to bring questions and be informed.114 The American Medical Association acknowledges that ― ‗[t]he patient‘s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an
informed choice‘ and that ‗the patient should make his or her own
determination about treatment.‘ ‖115
Women still value and retain a strong appreciation of science and
medical expertise, but they also inform themselves and supplement
medical guidance.116 Women have more access than ever to information about childbirth. They rely on books, the Internet, and relationships to supplement the expertise of their doctor, providing a diverse array of perspectives.117
Yet importantly, not all women are attaining such idealized partnerships. Rather, many women are not ―afforded the ability of shopping for a doctor that will honor their beliefs.‖118 Class, immigration
status, insurance coverage, and geography reveal that this explanation cannot entirely account for the absence of conflict in medical decision-making. ―Poor women are constrained by the conditions under
which they have babies and the kind of care open to them . . . and this
affects their ability to acquire knowledge about birth and their ability

assert their control over childbirth. Today, nearly half of the students enrolling in medical
school are women. See id. at 2. (comparing this statistic to the eleven percent of women
medical students in 1970). The authors caution that ―complete integration remains elusive.‖ Id. at 190. Women are particularly strongly represented in pediatrics and obstetric/gynecology practice areas. See id. at 66 (noting that women represent 53% of pediatricians and 34.3% of OB/GYNs).
113. Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical DecisionMaking: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 87 (2010).
―[A]bsent the pregnant woman‘s consent, her doctor has no more right to adopt the fetus as
his ‗second‘ patient than he does to make any of her other living children, or even her husband, his patient.‖ Oberman, supra note 4, at 473.
114. APPLE, supra note 112, at 125, 139 (2006) (explaining how these shifting hierarchies were brought about by the Women‘s Health Movement and reformers such as Grantley
Dick-Reid‘s work on Childbirth Without Fear and Fernand Lamaze‘s focus on childbirth preparedness, as well as the transformative publication of Our Bodies, Ourselves).
115. Moulton & King, supra 113, at 87.
116. APPLE, supra note 112, at 153 (noting that they do not rely much on innate expertise).
117. Id. at 144. See generally MAY FRIEDMAN, MOMMYBLOGS AND THE CHANGING FACE
OF MOTHERHOOD (2013) (documenting the diverse range of maternal experiences reflected
in the ―mamasphere‖ and the vast numbers of women who engaged in Internet ―dialogue
and interactivity‖ to share experiences).
118. Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 289.
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to act on such knowledge.‖119 Poor women more often give birth in
public hospitals where they face long waits and interact with innumerable ―nurses,‖ ―aides,‖ ―clerks,‖ ―nutritionists,‖ ―social workers,‖
and doctors.120 These institutional and inter-personal obstacles impede the flow of information, lead to contradictory advice, and complicate autonomy.121 Poor women birthing in public hospitals ―rarely
reach[] a point at which they ha[ve] sufficient knowledge to manipulate the system to obtain more influence over their childbirth.‖122 As
the 2010 Blueprint on Maternity Care Report concluded, in the current model of hospital-based maternity care ―[t]he vision of engaged
and empowered childbearing women and families at the ‗center‘ of
well-coordinated maternity care is largely unrealized at present.‖123
And even the exercise of autonomy requires careful study of the
doctor-patient relationship because informed consent requires unbiased thorough counseling.124 This is particularly important given the
anomalous distinction of childbirth where the doctor needs to present
information regarding maternal risks and fetal risks. We generally
endorse the principle of individual autonomy but it is harder to position in the doctor-patient relationship.125 Women do not hold total
agency in childbirth,126 nor is that necessarily the goal.127 Thus, while
the actualization of women‘s autonomy might partly explain the absence of conflict, it is far from a complete or universal explanation.128
Alternatively, do birthing women and doctors align with such
normalcy because women acquiesce to medical expertise? This explanation aligns with a longstanding historical shift to the primacy of
119. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 26 (internal citation omitted).
120. Id. at 32.
121. Id. at 32-33, 39 (further noting that women are, in turn, frustrated by these information gaps, and they struggle to even communicate that dissatisfaction to caregivers).
122. Id. at 39.
123. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S35 (concluding that the modern system ―does not
engage consumers as partners and empower them to take an active role in coordinating
their own care‖).
124. Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 436-37 (2006).
125. Shultz, supra note 53, at 221.
126. See, e.g., LUPTON, supra note 19, at 154 (noting that, despite these movements,
―recent commentators have pointed out that such a shift in discourse and practice has not
necessarily liberated women to enjoy freedom and agency while in childbirth‖).
127. MILLER, supra note 83, at 31 (revealing ―ways in which . . . expert knowledge is not
rejected or even particularly resisted, but rather engaged with and thereby reinforced‖).
128. See Rebecca A. Spence, Abandoning Women to Their Rights: What Happens When
Feminist Jurisprudence Ignores Birthing Rights, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 75, 97 (arguing that all women do not enjoy ―meaningful birthing rights‖ and that ―feminist lawyers
can and must play a part in developing a robust conception of reproductive justice that
includes birthing women, centering and prioritizing the needs of those with the least access
to reproductive freedom‖).
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doctors in reproductive decision-making.129 Women endure tremendous pressure to be ―perfect mothers.‖130 This involves a deep pressure to make decisions that do not negatively impact their children.131
It is child-centered and it relies on the role of experts.132 If women do
not ―do everything (which means availing herself of technological
birth), the process is her individual responsibility, and ultimately she
must be blamed if she does not have the perfect birth.‖133
In this context, even for women, it is harder to position autonomy
in the doctor-patient relationship when we hire doctors because of
their expertise.134 Women‘s own accounts of childbirth confirm that
they ―seek out and prioritise what they see as expert knowledge.‖135
In fact, women have ―increased engagement with expert bodies of
knowledge and practices‖ and report that such practices are ―reassuring‖ and help them ―allay fears around perceived risks.‖136 This reliance on experts is part of a transitional process into motherhood
whereby uncertainty is mitigated by risk avoidance: ―[S]ecurity is
maintained throughout this period of transition based on a relationship of trust in experts and the knowledge that appropriate and responsible preparation, which implicitly diminishes risk, is being undertaken.‖137 After birth, many women subsequently ―question their
‗expert‘ preparation‖ and question experts, demoting the positioning
of experts.138
129. See EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 30, at 28-30; LEAVITT, supra note 26, at 191.
130. Erika Horwitz, Resistance as a Site of Empowerment: The Journey Away from
Maternal Sacrifice, in MOTHER OUTLAWS: THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF EMPOWERED
MOTHERING 43, 44 (Andrea O‘Reilly ed., 2004); see, e.g., JULIE BORT, AVIVA PFLOCK &
DEVRA RENNER, MOMMY GUILT (2005) (proposing principles of a ―guilt-free‖ philosophy of
mothering); PHILIP G. PETERS, JR., HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? OBLIGATIONS TO THE
CHILDREN OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 256 (2004) (describing the risks to ―future children‖ in modern reproductive technologies and proposing greater regulation that would
―minimize the risks that they impose on future children by proceeding cautiously
and carefully‖).
131. Horwitz, supra note 130, at 47.
132. Charlotte Faircloth, ‗Intensive Motherhood‘ in Comparative Perspective: Feminism,
Full-Term Breastfeeding and Attachment Parenting in London and Paris, in PARENTING IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: NEGOTIATING IDEOLOGIES OF KINSHIP, SELF AND POLITICS 119, 122
(Charlotte Faircloth, Diane M. Hoffman & Linda L. Layne eds., 2013) [hereinafter
PARENTING IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE] (explaining how critics of intensive motherhood say
that it reduces the agency of children, and the effect of ―peers and social climate on child
development is eclipsed through this focus on parents‖).
133. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 25, 27 (internal citations omitted).
134. Shultz, supra note 53, at 221.
135. MILLER, supra note 83, at 48.
136. Id. at 74.
137. Id. at 61; see also id. at 72 (―Through engagement with the medical profession and
the regular monitoring of their pregnancies the women could be seen to be preparing to
become mothers, in appropriate ways, reducing risk and acting responsibly.‖).
138. Id. at 61-62 (describing this subsequent questioning as part of becoming a mother
and ―regaining a sense of . . . self‖).
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Acquiescence to medical expertise in childbirth also often involves
acquiescence to technology. Modern women rely less on social support
and inter-generational guidance, and defer more to technological understandings of pregnancy and childbirth.139 This changes the calculus of deference to medical expertise by leaving women to ironically
perceive ―greater uncertainty and risk‖ when expert knowledge is
ordinarily called upon to achieve more certainty and predictability.140
Acquiescence to medical expertise invokes historical skepticism,
however. As Lupton concludes, ―[w]omen‘s deference to the ‗doctor
knows best‘ ideology may be related to the asymmetry of information
between doctors and patients, socialized respect for professionals
with specialized training and for men in general.‖141 It puts doctors in
a position to ―preempt patient authority.‖142 Women‘s own accounts of
childbirth question the autonomy of acquiescence. They express frustration that their doctors acted like ―they, rather than their ‗patients,‘
knew best.‖143 Women who knew and trusted their attendants believed their attendants ―acted in their best interests‖ and ―remembered their care far more positively,‖ while those with poor interpersonal relationships reported less positive experiences.144
The acquiescence to medical expertise explanation is further complicated by the complexities of modern medical decisions. Physicians
work within a complex web of forces that shape their own decisionmaking, including private insurers, federal programs, and hospitals
administrations.145 While women‘s subordination, autonomy, and acquiescence to medical expertise might explain some degree of women‘s alignment with their doctors, these accounts are polarized and
even demonizing at times. The next section explores a more complex
and nuanced explanation.
B. The Shared Fetal-Focus Framework
Some women and their doctors align in decision-making by adopting a framework that always selects the outcome that minimizes any
risks to the fetus, presumptively and universally subordinating risks

139. Id. at 49-51 (noting how this phenomenon has been described as ―technobirth‖).
140. Id. at 48 (noting that this has moral underpinnings grounded in ― ‗responsible‘
motherhood‖).
141. LUPTON, supra note 19, at 158.
142. Shultz, supra note 53, at 221.
143. Angela Davis, Choice, Policy and Practice in Maternity Care Since 1948, HIST. &
POL‘Y (May 30, 2013), http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/choice-policyand-practice-in-maternity-care-since-1948 (emphasis added).
144. See DAVIS, supra note 49, at 107.
145. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 40 (noting that medical services are provided by many
genuinely caring medical providers, but within the confines of a profit-based system).
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to the birthing woman.146 This explanation raises complex and pervasive issues regarding how we understand obstetric care, decisionmaking methodologies, birthing autonomy, and reproductive rights.
As the next section explores, while this decision-making methodology
might actualize the autonomy of the women who elect it, it normalizes a problematic standard of care that creates an illusion of autonomy for all women.
While shared medical decision-making is not unique to childbirth,
it is particularly distinct when the decision-making lens is focused on
a putative third party—the fetus. This is not exclusively a problem
involving doctors or the state giving primacy to fetal interests. Rather, doctors and women patients both purport to function in a fetalfocused frame.
Doctors do acknowledge that they often act primarily to minimize
fetal risks. Many care providers admit that they feel ―legally (or morally) responsible for the fetus and as such may override the needs of
the women in order to assist the fetus.‖147 The focus on minimizing all
fetal risks has been offered to explain the absence of adequate informed consent in childbirth as well.148 The unique presence of the
fetus in birth might
account for the seemingly lax manner in which the informed consent doctrine has been applied in such cases. In the circumstances
of labor and birth, the mother‘s individual right to informed consent must be weighed against a heavier counterbalance—the newborn infant—which carries with it a heavy load of emotional and
cultural force.149

146. Despite its joyous and celebratory framing, pregnancy and childbirth is still dangerous for women. Indeed the maternal mortality rate in the United States has nearly
doubled in the last two decades, hovering between twelve and fifteen deaths per 100,000
live births between 2003 and 2007. Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2007, 58
NAT‘L VITAL STAT. REP. 13 (2010), available at http://cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/
nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf. In addition, considerable racial disparities exist in maternal mortality rates. The maternal mortality rate for African American women was 26.5, roughly 2.7
times the rate for white women (10 deaths per 100,000 live births). Id. Although maternal
mortality declined dramatically over the last century, the ratio has increased over the last
several decades. U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD HEALTH USA 2008–2009,
at 24 (2009), available at http://mchb.hrsa.gov/publications/pdfs/childhealth200809.pdf.
147. Sue Kruske et al., Maternity Care Providers‘ Perceptions of Women‘s Autonomy
and the Law, 13:84 BMC PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH 4 (2013); see also Jamie Abrams, Distorted and Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1955 (2013) (concluding that women are subordinated to fetuses in the dual patient model).
148. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women‘s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L.& MED. 567, 600-03 (2011).
149. Ketler, supra note 5, at 1039-40.
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Fear of costly litigation for fetal harms might also drive doctors to
prioritize minimizing all fetal risks.150 Scholars have previously
acknowledged how this fetal focus is problematic for women.151
Notably, however, many women are also electing the decisionmaking framework that minimizes any risks to the fetus although
the rationales and implications are quite different for women than for
doctors. Many women‘s own framings of childbirth have changed
too.152 Childbirth is often understood as a sacrifice distinctly of women‘s health in the name of perceptively or actually minimizing risks
to their fetus. Many identify mother as ―synonymous with sacrifice.‖153 ―[M]others are now being usurped in the public consciousness
by their fetuses,‖154 reflecting a ―giant collective wish for perfect
mothering.‖155 This leaves ―the stakes of motherhood . . . so high.‖156
One anesthesiologist described her own delivery as follows:
I don‘t really care about the birth experience like a lot of patients
do—into soft lights, soft music garbage. For me it was getting a
good baby. I‘ve seen too many times where patients are so concerned about it being a lovely experience for them that this has
overridden the desires for having a good baby and they put themselves and their birth experience in front of having a ―good‖ baby
come out and having the best care for that baby.157

These cultural shifts continue into parenting too. Many women
today deploy ―intensive mothering‖ frameworks ―focus[ing] on chil-

150. OB/GYNs face great medical malpractice liability, in terms of the frequency of
lawsuits and the magnitude of the verdicts recovered. See generally AM. COLL. OF LEGAL
MED., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SURVIVAL HANDBOOK (2007). The American College of Legal
Medicine reports that nearly eight out of ten OB/GYNs have been sued at least once in
their career, and almost half have been sued three or more times. Id. at 341, 347-48 (noting
that these suits are often for shoulder dystocia or failure to perform a timely cesarean delivery). These suits often yield high monetary damages because of the extent of injuries
(e.g., cerebral palsy) and the emotionally compelling nature. Id. Recovery rates are nearly
fifty percent greater in obstetric malpractice claims than overall medical malpractice
claims. Id. at 347.
151. KITZINGER, supra note 51, at 87 (―[G]iving prime consideration to the fetus as a
patient and seeing the woman merely as a container for it, she is reduced to a being a
non-person.‖).
152. SHARI L. THURER, THE MYTHS OF MOTHERHOOD: HOW CULTURE REINVENTS THE
GOOD MOTHER xv (1994) (noting that these re-inventions are a mythology). Indeed,
parenthood itself is ―political‖ and understanding how parents act as decision makers is
noteworthy. LAUREL ELDER & STEVEN GREENE, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLITICIZATION AND POLARIZATION OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2012).
153. Horwitz, supra note 130, at 43.
154. THURER, supra note 152, at 294.
155. Id. at xvi.
156. Id. at xxiii.
157. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 35.
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dren to the exclusion of a focus on one‘s own concerns as an adult.‖158
Modern parenting is uniquely child-centered.159 While specific choices
and strategies for parenting exist, this child-focused frame of modern
parenting is ―widely shared and often unquestioned.‖160 Modern parenting is ―virtually synonymous with worry‖ as parents seek to ensure that their children are ―healthy—physically, mentally, and emotionally.‖161 These modern anxieties distinctly position parents as
more engaged in the ―formative stage, and believe that children‘s experiences during the first two or three years of life mold their personality, lay the foundation for future cognitive and psychological
development, and leave a lasting imprint on their emotional life.‖162
This approach—the shared focus on minimizing all fetal harms—
is critical to examine when understood through a tort law lens, to
understand how this framework is problematic for the women who do
not adopt it. These dominant practices become ―ritual[ized]‖ and then
―transmit and reinforce gendered values‖163 that are, in turn, enshrined in tort standards of care, as explored below.
IV. WHY WHAT ―MOST WOMEN‖ DO IS CRITICAL TO
AUTONOMY FOR ALL WOMEN
The question of what ―most women‖ do is deeply antithetical to
reproductive rights advocacy. Women‘s reproductive rights advocacy
has worked extensively to defend the childbirth choices and autono-

158. MARGARET K. NELSON, PARENTING OUT OF CONTROL: ANXIOUS PARENTS IN
UNCERTAIN TIMES 19 (2010) (noting how changes in technology such as baby monitors and
GPS systems have changed parenting greatly).
159. Diane M. Hoffman, Power Struggles: The Paradoxes of Emotion and Control
Among Child-Centered Mothers in Privileged America, in PARENTING IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 132, at 229 (describing how modern parents focus on the child‘s
developmental needs and keenly respect the child as an individual).
160. Id. at 230.
161. APPLE, supra note 112, at 1. Beginning in the 1970s distinctly, ―parental anxieties
greatly increased both in scope and intensity‖ as parents first sought to protect children
from harms more consciously with inventions such as car seats, bike helmets, and babyproofing products. Parenting, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN HISTORY
AND SOCIETY, http://www.faqs.org/childhood/Me-Pa/Parenting.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2015) [hereinafter Parenting]. This stands in stark contrast to earlier framings of American
parenting, which have shifted from ―adults in training‖ models to scientific models to the
quest for emotional and psychological fulfillment. Id. The term ―parenting‖ itself is new—
injected with deep ―critiques of value, practice and ideals and critiques of power.‖
PARENTING IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 132, at 8; see also id. at 2 (― ‗[P]arenting‘
also demands a discussion of reflexivity and individual ‗identity work‘: to parent is to be
discursively positioned by and actively contributing to the networks of idea, value, practice
and social relations that have come to define a particular form of the politics of parentchild relations within the domain of the contemporary family.‖).
162. Parenting, supra note 161.
163. Miller, supra note 83, at 59.
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my of women, particularly where such rights are positioned in conflict with their doctors, with the state, and with the fetus.164
But tort law reveals what ―count[s]‖ as an injury in our society
and which injuries matter more.165 Tort law is not an ―objective system of adjudication‖; rather, value judgments are embedded within
this system to distribute suffering.166 Tort law does not just recognize
and compensate injuries; it ―does the political and social work of determining what will count as an injury and, ultimately, how it will be
distributed.‖167
It is thus critical that tort law standards are grounded in community-based determinations of reasonable behavior that are entirely
shaped by what ―most women‖ do. Thus, when a ―community shares
a value widely‖ that dominant value can become the standard of
care.168 For example, many states approach informed consent from
the perspective of what is significant to the ―reasonable patient,‖ effectively ―most patients.‖169 For example, one informed consent birthing form states, ―[f]etal monitoring by electronic machine is welcomed
by the majority of mothers—any fears or questions?‖170
Communities in tort law are distinctly invoked to make negligence
law palatable. Community-based standard setting helps to ―soften
the hard surface‖ that the imposition of objective standards on indi-

164. See, e.g., Amy Kay Boatright, State Control Over the Bodies of Pregnant Women,
11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 903 (2001) (examining the state‘s authority to control a
woman‘s body during her pregnancy); Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman:
Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97
(2010) (examining how courts use the theoretical availability of alternative reproductive
health services to prove that women‘s health will not suffer and that courts also blame
women for the lack of available services in ways that undervalue women‘s health); V.
Chandis & T. Williams, The Patient, the Doctor, the Fetus, and the Court-Compelled Cesarean: Why Courts Should Address the Question Through a Bioethical Lens, 25 MED. & L. 729
(2006) (presenting a bioethical lens to address conflict); Law, supra note 20, at 361-62;
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Benjamin Grant Chojnacki, Note, Pushing Back:
Protecting Maternal Autonomy from the Living Room to the Delivery Room, 23
J.L. & HEALTH 45 (2010) (proposing changes to promote maternal autonomy).
165. SARAH S. LOCHLANN JAIN, INJURY: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT DESIGN AND SAFETY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2006) (―[E]normous amounts of discursive energy frame and
consolidate what will count as rational behaviors and whose interests these will privilege.‖).
166. Id. at 34 (explaining how law functions in ―highly specific contexts‖ and reflects
the socially constructed view of ―acceptable relations between persons and things‖). Tort
law ―redistribute[s] human wounding . . . with vast implications of whose bodies the costs
of progress fall into.‖ Id. at 5.
167. Id. at 2 (chronicling differences in legal responses to different types of product
injuries).
168. Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 W ASH . & LEE L. REV . 1313, 135455 (1994).
169. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 430.
170. KITZINGER, supra note 51, at 91.
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viduals can create.171 Communities can stifle resentment of the more
―distant, impersonal commands of negligence doctrine.‖172 It allows
the law to ―outsource‖ the liability question to a group and ―away
from an abstract universal ideal.‖173
The role of community-based consensus among doctors is distinctly acute in setting standards of obstetric care. Tort law standards
―require that physicians provide reasonable care under the circumstances, as judged against the level of knowledge and skill exercised
by their professional peers.‖174 Tort law gives a heightened deference
to the customs of the medical community.175 Obstetric medical practitioners themselves set the standards of care that govern obstetrics,
thus valuing collective professional medical organizations and consensus heavily. This standard setting and the uniquely communitybased approach in which it occurs reveal how critical the tort law
lens is to understanding the treatment of birthing women.
What ―most women‖ do is also important because it shapes our
very understanding of injuries. We process injuries against a larger
social and political backdrop in a process that is ―largely nonconscious or preconscious.‖176 ―[I]njuries are not objective facts; rather,
they are events that humans perceive and interpret within ideational
frameworks that reflect a deep interaction between self and culture.‖177 They are processed in the context of the physical environment in which they occur.178 The processing of an injury is subject to
recursive interactional influences of friends, family, and others ―that
takes place over time and draws third parties into the victim‘s processes of cognition and response to injuries.‖179

171. Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 736 (2002).
172. Id. at 739.
173. Id. at 741.
174. Id. at 764.
175. Id. (explaining that, whereas for ―many other occupations [courts] think of custom
as merely relevant or admissible, the law of medical malpractice equates custom or substantially accepted practice with the standard of care‖). Historically, this deference was
quite problematic because the medical community perpetuated a norm of ―cohesion‖ that
prevented physicians from testifying against each other in court. Id. at 764-65.
176. Engel, supra note 81, at 303-04; see also id. at 296, 321; id. at 328 (explaining how
―[t]he embodied mind would integrate [an injury] instantly and nonconsciously into its life
story, and the injury victim would very likely describe the injury to others, including
friends, family, and co-workers, as well as professional service providers,‖ and with each
retelling arises an ―opportunity for revision‖).
177. Id. at 319.
178. Id. at 314-18.
179. Id. at 306; id. at 328 (describing how with each retelling of an injury ―each listener
might offer comments or reactions that alter the original perception and, recursively, help
to create a revised narrative the next time around‖).
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The risk of bias is particularly problematic in the tort system. The
tort system involves jurors comparing the conduct of stakeholders to
their own ―prototypes of how reasonable people behave.‖180 Jurors can
employ many biases in this process. Accordingly cognitive bias complicates autonomy in cases where women seek to exercise their autonomy in ways other than that which most reduces risks to the fetus.181
So, while antithetical to conventional framings of women‘s birthing
rights, the lens of what ―most women‖ do is critical to understanding
the standard of care that is applied to all women in childbirth.
V. HOW DECISION-MAKING MODELS TO MINIMIZE FETAL
HARMS CREATE AN ILLUSION OF AUTONOMY
While women‘s alignment with their doctors to choose the outcome
that minimizes all fetal risks can actualize autonomy in individual
cases, that approach—when adopted by communities of women—
risks becoming the standard of care that is applied to all women. The
framework is problematic because it creates an illusion of autonomy
given the ease with which doctors can ―preempt patient authority.‖182
Women‘s autonomy can easily be overridden by the doctor unilaterally selecting the outcome that best minimizes fetal risks and thereby
foregoing actual informed consent and consideration of maternal
risks. This positions doctors with a ―trump card‖ to play to ensure
that maternal-doctor conflicts arise only rarely. For example, ―if you
say to a woman that there‘s a 1% chance this may save the baby‘s
life, she‘ll take it.‖183 This is particularly so in the context of cesarean
sections: ―[m]ost women, if told by an obstetrician that a cesarean is
best for the baby, go along with professional advice.‖184 Thus, the
model looks at first glance like it actualizes women‘s autonomy, but it
is an illusion because her decision is pre-ordained by the doctors‘
communication of fetal risks and can be easily over-stepped, ignoring
maternal risks. It suggests that medical providers‘ ―conscious belief
in women‘s autonomy may not translate to actual practice.‖185 Providing increased information to obstetric patients is not likely to change
the outcomes.186 Thus, ―all but the most idiosyncratic patients will
agree with the doctor‘s recommendation.‖187
180. Neil R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About
Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 73 (1995).
181. Id. at 85-87.
182. Shultz, supra note 53, at 221.
183. KITZINGER, supra note 51, at 77 (internal citations omitted).
184. Id. at 80 (explaining how this accordingly becomes a ―quick fix‖ to problems).
185. See Kruske et al., supra note 147, at 4.
186. Law, supra note 20, at 365.
187. Id.
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The illusion of autonomy can be seen in one medical text that purports to instruct obstetricians in responding to conflict with birthing
women over medical decision-making. Clinical Obstetrics: The Fetus & Mother includes a chapter on the medico-social considerations
of pregnancy, which discusses the ―Ethical and Legal Dimensions of
Medicine of the Pregnant Woman and Fetus.‖188 The text explains
that any balancing between fetal benefit and maternal risk ―must
recognize that a pregnant woman is obligated only to take reasonable
risks of medical interventions that are reliably expected to benefit
the viable fetus or later child.‖189 It states that, unbelievably, ―[s]uch
conflict is best managed preventatively through the informed consent
process as an ongoing dialogue throughout a woman‘s pregnancy
augmented as necessary by negotiation and respectful persuasion.‖190
This illusion of autonomy can also be seen in the results of an
Australian study considering health care professionals‘ perceptions of
women‘s accountability and the providers‘ own legal accountability.191
Notably, both midwives and doctors had previously agreed that women hold the right to autonomy in birthing.192 Participants were asked
about the extent to which they agreed with this statement: ―In collaborative practice, working with primary carers, the final decision
should always rest with the woman.‖193 Midwives agreed with this
statement significantly more than doctors. When asked to rate disagreement with the statements, ― ‗For the safety of the baby, the maternity care team sometimes need[s] to override the needs of the
woman‘ and ‗Encouraging women to have more control over their
childbearing compromises safety,‘ ‖ doctors agreed that they sometimes had to override the woman‘s interests, but midwives were more
neutral with respect to that statement.194 Midwives disagreed significantly more than doctors with the idea that autonomy created safety
concerns.195 Thus, doctors perceived a tension between autonomy and
practice. As one researcher summarized, both midwives and obstetricians ―only support women to make the final decision about an aspect
of their care when this decision is what the care provider prefers.‖196
American doctors ―expresse[d] a dedication to letting patients have
188. Judith L. Chervenak, Frank A. Chervenak & Lawrence B. McCullough, Ethical and
Legal Dimensions of Medicine of the Pregnant Woman and Fetus, in CLINICAL OBSTETRICS:
THE FETUS & MOTHER 1039 (E. Albert Reece & John C. Hobbins eds., 3d ed. 2007).
189. Id. at 1042.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. See Kruske et al., supra note 147.
192. Id. at 3.
193. Id.
194. Id. (emphasis omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 4.
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decision-making power‖ but then described the patients‘ desires as
―frivolous and as potentially conflicting with what [the doctor] decides ‗needs to happen.‘ ‖197 ―Obstetricians continually described their
primary role as sentries on the lookout for peril; they encountered
conflicts as they heroically attempted to persuade misinformed or
poorly informed patients to understand that doctors were the best
judges of what is safe.‖198 This is the illusion of autonomy.
Medical providers reported ―a poor understanding of their own
legal accountability, and the rights of the woman and her fetus.‖199
This lack of clarity is problematic both for both women and their doctors. Health care professionals need clear guidance on how to handle
requests to refuse medical treatment specifically in a system that
values evidence-based decision-making and autonomy.200
Technology can distinctly perpetuate the illusion of autonomy in
its perceived objectivity, but its distinct focus is on fetal outcomes.
Fetal monitoring technology emerged in the 1960s to project images
of the fetus, ―seemingly independent‖ from the woman and ―taking on
a human form.‖201 Notably, its scientific reliability and its necessity
have been heavily contested.202
Fetal monitoring technology has ―displaced the woman‘s testimony
from the central position it once held in the understanding of the fetus and the development of her pregnancy.‖203 While a woman‘s sensory awareness of her fetus, which long predated technological capabilities, used to be valued, many would say that today it is ―completely ignored.‖204 Fetal imagery perpetuates the illusion of autonomy
because ―representation of the fetus in isolation, abstracted from the
body of the woman within which it is located, facilitates a perception
of the fetus as a being that deserves no fewer rights than the wom197. SIMONDS ET AL., supra note 91, at 219.
198. Id. at 218.
199. Kruske et al., supra note 147, at 1.
200. Id.
201. Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse of the Fetal Autonomy, 8
UCLA WOMEN‘S L.J. 47, 51 (1997).
202. MANUAL OF OBSTETRICS, supra note 69, at 408 (concluding that ―[s]ome form of
evaluation of fetal well-being during labor is recommended,‖ but noting that ―no randomized controlled study has ever shown continuous electronic fetal monitoring to be associated with better fetal outcomes than other forms of monitoring‖). The authors explain that
―[t]he main risk of electronic fetal heart rate monitoring is inaccurate pattern interpretation, thereby allowing a nonreassuring fetal status to go unrecognized or, conversely, and
more commonly, precipitating unnecessary intervention in a healthy fetus.‖ Id.
203. MALCOLM NICOLSON & JOHN E.E. FLEMING, IMAGING AND IMAGINING THE FETUS:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OBSTETRIC ULTRASOUND 257 (2013) (noting that feminists have
critiqued the universal use of the ultrasound).
204. Id. at 258, 264 (―It is not surprising, therefore, that the ultrasound image has been
accepted as a virtually unchallengeable source of authoritative knowledge about the fetus,
by professionals and laypeople alike.‖).
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an.‖205 It produces an ―image of the fetus . . . independent of the uterus and sustains it, and by constituting the fetus as a patient in its
own right, ultrasound has divided . . . the fetus from the pregnant
woman.‖206 So, the use of fetal technology pushes the fetus‘s status as
a patient forward, removes the woman‘s voice as a patient (to varying
degrees), and yields a primacy in the ―objective‖ nature perceived to
derive from fetal monitoring.207 ―The animation of fetal life through
such imagery did more than just personify the fetus. As the fetus
emerged as a person, the pregnant woman began literally to disappear
from view.‖208 Indeed, fetal monitoring often triggers (many times inaccurately) fetal distress, which is the basis for cesarean delivery.209
Yet, again, it is not exclusively a problem with medical professionals. While women have deferred to the medical expertise of doctors in
childbirth for over a century,210 modern women distinctly defer to
technological understandings of pregnancy and childbirth.211 For example, many women describe fetal imagery as ―reassuring.‖212 The
reliance on medical experts reveals the ―seduction of formal, medicalized preparation‖ for childbirth, seduction rooted in women‘s ―notions
of risk, safety,‖ and desire to be ―seen to act responsibly.‖213
It is hard—if not impossible—for women to ―counterpoise the natural against the artificial, our intuitive, direct knowledge of our own
bodies against the alien information derived from a machine.‖214 This
is an example of ―demythologizing,‖ whereby women are not just trying to disprove an outcome, but to break an entrenched stereotype,

205. Morris, supra note 201, at 63.
206. NICOLSON & FLEMING, supra note 203, at 258, 264, 267 (explaining how fetal imagery ―has been used beyond objective diagnostic tools‖ and explaining that the fetal image
holds ―affective, ethical, and religious rather than narrowly diagnostic‖ roles).
207. Id. at 262.
208. DANIELS, supra note 72, at 21.
209. STRONG, supra note 7, at 178.
210. ―The concept of scientific motherhood . . . permeated . . . the country,‖ however, by
the turn of the twentieth century, as mothers began to accept a ―crucial role of contemporary science and medicine‖ in child rearing and care and ―expect that medical and scientific
experts and expertise should intervene in their daily lives.‖ APPLE, supra note 112, at 10,
33. Women actively sought out expert medical and scientific guidance in ―all areas of child
care, from mundane tasks to critical illness,‖ and this quest still thrives today. Id. at 33; see
also id. at 157 (stating that popular culture reveals ―just how far scientific motherhood
[has] been normalized‖).
211. MILLER, supra note 83, at 49 (noting how this phenomenon has been described as
―technobirth‖).
212. LUPTON, supra note 19, at 157 (explaining how women‘s views of fetal imagery are
shaped by their ―age, past reproductive experiences, ethnicity, sexual preference, health
status and desire for a child‖).
213. MILLER, supra note 83, at 75.
214. NICOLSON & FLEMING, supra note 203, at 263 (explaining how we are perceived to
―aid and improve our senses with technology‖).

2014]

WOMEN‘S MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING

47

which can be futile.215 Doctors can easily cut the birthing woman out
of the decision-making metric and act directly in the interests of minimizing fetal harms. As the former chairman of the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center
in New York and co-chair of the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists‘ committee reviewing obstetric practices once concluded, ―we were beginning to forget that instruments such as electronic
fetal monitors were tools to be used by the doctor, not decisionmaking machines to replace medical judgment.‖216
This illusion of autonomy can—and indeed has—distorted the
standard of care itself, thus implicating all women, as explored
more below.
VI. WHEN THE DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK OF MOST WOMEN
IS APPLIED TO ALL WOMEN IT PROBLEMATICALLY
ALTERS MEDICAL STANDARDS OF CARE
The minimization of all fetal harms decision-making model is
problematic because its replication by ―most women‖ in childbirth
risks distorting the standard of care governing childbirth for all
women. It suggests that the standard of care in childbirth requires
complete compliance with medical advice and the minimization of all
fetal risks. The actual standards of care, however, would require patient autonomy and only the minimization of unreasonable risks.
This reveals the ghost of Roe v. Wade‘s217 medical model.
A. Minimization of All Fetal Harms Instead of
Unreasonable Risks
Standards of care are ordinarily framed around unacceptable or
unreasonable risks. Yet the risk-avoidance behaviors discussed above
suggest an elevated standard of care that requires the elimination of
any risk to the fetus. This is socially constructed risk avoidance.
Indeed some doctors do suggest that the ―minimization of fetal
risks‖ is the lens that should govern women‘s decision-making. One
explicit example of this thinking can be seen in the specialty text,
Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine. The text acknowledges the bodily integrity of the birthing woman as an ―important ethical
value‖ crucial to the right of ―self-determination.‖218 It advises only
―the most compelling of reasons‖ would allow for these rights to be

215. DANIELS, supra note 72, at 100.
216. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 28.
217. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
218. STRONG, supra note 7, at 180 (explaining that these rights are supported by a
wealth of literature).
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violated.219 It concludes that, while prevention of harm to the fetus is
a ―serious concern,‖ it cannot override the ―normative personhood
status‖ of the woman carrying the child.220 Yet, notably, the text then
acknowledges repeatedly that the argument can be made that the
woman has an ―obligation to promote the interests of her fetus‖ and
that this obligation increases in advanced gestational states.221 It
states that mothers owe ―an obligation to protect the offspring from
harm.‖222 These statements suggest poignantly that some degree of
conflict is avoided by a wholesome presumption—the imputation of
an unwritten duty even—that women will always act to minimize
fetal risks.
B. Complete Compliance with Medical Advice Has
Never Been a Standard of Care
It further suggests that complete compliance with expert advice
becomes the standard of care by which women are judged to be ―acting responsibly and avoiding unnecessary risks.‖223
During pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood, avoiding risk, and
so being seen to be responsible, continues to involve placing trust
in experts. To resist such engagement, to avoid screening tests,
clinic visits and expert advice would be regarded as irresponsible
behaviour. Such actions would be seen to jeopardise the woman‘s
own health ―and more importantly, that of the foetus she is carrying and expected to protect and nourish in a proper maternal
manner.‖224

As one woman articulated, ―[t]here comes a point where you feel not
trusting your doctor is not trusting your own judgment because you
put time into selecting him and, should you begin to doubt him, you
lose confidence in your own ability to make sound judgments.‖225
The ―reasonable patient‖ matters greatly to tort law from the perspective of juror perception, comparative negligence claims, and informed consent models. Thus, the idea that all women are normalized
toward a particular decision-making framework marginalizes those
who adopt a different framework. Doctors‘ accounts of patient inter-

219. Id.
220. Id. at 181.
221. Id. at 179 (―Moreover, if there is going to be a future child with normative personhood status, the woman has a parental obligation to avoid actions that would be harmful to
the child.‖).
222. Id. at 62.
223. MILLER, supra note 83, at 74, 87.
224. Id. at 48-49.
225. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 38.
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actions indeed describe ―noncompliant patients as irritating and irrational.‖226 One doctor explains the discomfort of patient autonomy:
[Patient autonomy] makes it much more difficult. So I try to explain, in layman‘s terms always, the consequences of the decisions
and empower the patient to make the choice. Almost always they‘ll
end up choosing my recommendation when they realize that the
choice is theirs. It‘s very rare for someone, when they understand
that my training says that [if] we go down this road, we do have
the risk of compromising the baby, most folks choose and trust my
training. Occasionally, when they don‘t, it‘s very difficult, but we
can‘t assault someone, you know!227

Researchers describe how the obstetrician quoted above ―saw her expertise as ultimately trumping patients‘ contradictory viewpoints.
She portrays women‘s acquiescence as informed and sensible decision
making rather than as an act of submission. As she sees it, patients
must trust her to be the judge of whether what happens poses a risk
to the baby.‖228 Requiring complete compliance with medical guidance
would be distinct to childbirth, as any other patient can decline
medical treatment.
It is only in the context of pregnancy that doctors assert the right
to compel their patients to heed medical advice. Doctors‘ responses
to their pregnant patients therefore emerge as a startling exception to the nearly universal consensus that patients, not doctors,
should control determinations about whether and when to undergo
medical treatment.229

This is particularly problematic when understood in conjunction
with the preceding point whereby the standard is minimizing all fetal risks. Women must cede to medical authority at the expense of
their own autonomy, but also often at the expense of their own medical risks. One author describes this as a ―gestalt picture‖ where ―[a]s
the fetus comes into view, the woman disappears.‖230 Thus, women
have lost their autonomy and are being medically compelled to a selfsacrificial view of motherhood. ―Good mothers, it is implied, should
always wish to do what Doctor considers best for the fetus and unquestioningly take his advice.‖231

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

SIMONDS ET AL., supra note 91, at 218.
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 218.
Oberman, supra note 4, at 469.
Morris, supra note 201, at 50.
Id. at 64.

50

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:17

C. The Ghost of Roe v. Wade‘s Medical Model
This complete compliance with medical authority further reveals
the resurrection of the ghost of Roe v. Wade‘s232 medical model. The
medical model in Roe positioned pregnant women as shared decisionmakers with doctors, but really entrusted doctors with primacy. Roe
squarely positioned the decision to terminate a pregnancy as a medical decision, and moreover, one in which the doctor distinctly held
primacy over the pregnant woman.233 The Court held that, in the first
trimester, the abortion decision ―must be left to the medical judgment
of the pregnant woman‘s attending physician.‖234 In the third trimester, the Court limited the state‘s regulatory power by mandating
an exception to prohibitions on abortion ―where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother.‖235 Roe thus described the decision as one that ―vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment‖ and characterized the decision
as ―a medical decision‖ the ―basic responsibility for [which] must rest
with the physician.‖236
When read in conjunction with Doe v. Bolton,237 the medical lens
was notably a broad one—at least initially and doctrinally—that positioned the physician to make decisions based on women‘s health,
age, family status, and emotional well-being. In Bolton, the companion case to Roe, the Court further reinforced and explained the medical frame of the decision to terminate a pregnancy. In Bolton, the appellants challenged the criminal abortion statute in Georgia.238 The
statute had an exception de-criminalizing abortions when ―continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the pregnant woman
or would seriously and permanently injure her health,‖ but it hinged
that exception on the ―best clinical judgment‖ of a physician.239 The
plaintiffs challenged the statute, arguing that the ―necessary‖ language was not objective enough and fearing that doctors would
232. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
233. This medical approach derived explicitly from historical advocacy leading up to
Roe in which doctors and the American Medical Association sought to liberalize the criminal abortion laws by bestowing physicians with increased discretion to make the decision
for their female patients in limited circumstances. Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of
Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 387 (2013).
234. 410 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 165-66. Doctors had already exerted great influence in the early 1900s over
birth control regulation, many opposing its legalization and ultimately securing a ―monopoly
over its delivery.‖ CARON, supra note 102, at 4-6 (articulating the implications of physician
control over abortion on working-class women who could not afford the health care fees).
237. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
238. Id. at 181.
239. Id. at 183.
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―choose to err on the side of caution and will be arbitrary.‖240 The
Court upheld the district court‘s holding that ―health‖ was not vague
and was ―a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon to
make routinely whenever surgery is considered,‖ explaining that the
physicians‘ medical judgment
may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman‘s age—relevant to the wellbeing of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best
medical judgment. And it is room that operates for the benefit, not
the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.241

Roe‘s progeny later modified this health exception in critical ways by
limiting abortion to only the most extreme of medical harms facing
the pregnant woman—functionally to save the life of the pregnant
woman only.242 The breadth of the medical framing in Bolton is particularly noteworthy in the context of woman-doctor alignments. Notably, the ―medical model‖ of abortion empowered doctors in reproductive decision-making and further empowered doctors to police
their own professional membership.243
Roe‘s adoption of the medical model was widely criticized, yet it
persists.244 It is widely accepted that abortion jurisprudence has since
shifted to the woman‘s right to choose, away from a doctor‘s right to
decide in consultation with her. Yet, while abortion was characterized in Roe distinctly in the context of health care, the health care
delivery model for pregnancy termination became quickly isolated
among specialist doctors in specialized medical facilities. Current
framings of reproductive health ―sever[] the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy from access to healthcare necessary to exercise that
decision.‖245 The systematic access issues that this marginalization

240. Id. at 191 (arguing that the language is subject to diverse interpretation).
241. Id. at 192 (positioning the decision as ―routine[]‖ for physicians).
242. Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, Law, and Culture, 65
STAN. L. REV. 457, 497 (2013). Bridges compares this narrow framing to a broader range of
medical, nonmedical, physical, and psychological reasons that might necessitate an abortion in the Roe and Bolton framing. See id. at 459-60, 497, 516.
243. CARON, supra note 102, at 8.
244. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The Conflict over Constitutional Legitimacy, in
THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 13 (Gilbert Y. Steiner ed., 1983) (explaining how Roe ―sent shock waves through the country, affecting every aspect of political
life‖); Lindgren, supra note 233, at 396 (explaining how the medical model has been ―uniformly criticized‖ for ―deferring women‘s decisionmaking to the judgment of physicians‖).
245. Lindgren, supra note 233, at 388 (explaining how ―the right of abortion is in danger of becoming a right without a remedy as courts and legislatures restrict access to abortion healthcare services and regulate the consumer-provider relationship while nominally
reaffirming the ‗right to choose‘ ‖).
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creates are well documented and understood.246 Pregnancy termination services have been pushed out of health care models, and the
physicians who provide the care have been pushed out of professional
and social regard. The doctors who provide termination services have
been demonized, marginalized, and ostracized from the medical profession through professional regulations, litigation, harassment, and
violence.
The problematic bifurcation of obstetric health care and pregnancy termination health care was poignantly articulated in Gonzales v.
Carhart.247 The Court concluded that doctors protect fetal interests,
―abortion doctors‖ protect women‘s autonomy, women are naturally
destined to be mothers, and women who seek to terminate a pregnancy need to be protected.248 Indeed, Justice Kennedy in Carhart
specifically reflected the magnification of medicalized fetal interests
within the medical profession. His opinion reads as ―[d]eeply skeptical that the medical profession has used the health exception in good
faith,‖ and he ―seems to believe instead that physicians have used the
health exception as a proxy for promoting women‘s autonomy at the
expense of fetal life.‖249 Carhart reveals this bias most poignantly, not
only ―sever[ing] abortion from healthcare, but also appear[ing] hostile
to abortion providers,‖ describing them pejoratively as ―abortion doctors‖ and suggesting that women need to be ―protected from providers‖ who might fail to inform or guide them properly in their decision.250 This is a distinctly ―woman-protective argument.‖251 The
Court suggested that it was not just that women need to be protected
from poor decision-making; it is that women who seek to exercise
their decision-making autonomy in any way other than with a fetal
focus are in need of protective barriers. It is a false choice for women:
either act to protect fetal life or the state needs to protect you from
your decision-making.252
246. Id. at 390-91 (―Reclaiming abortion as a right of both healthcare and choice offers
the potential for reclaiming the right within the larger framework of reproductive justice
by granting all pregnant women, women who carry to term as well as women who choose to
terminate their pregnancies, the right to exercise bodily autonomy and access healthcare in
every aspect of their reproductive lives.‖).
247. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
248. See id. at 159-60
249. Sonia M. Suter, The ―Repugnance‖ Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories
of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1514, 1572 (2008).
250. Lindgren, supra note 233, at 405, 409-10 (explaining how Carhart and Casey have
put ―abortion exclusively as a right of choice, uncoupled from healthcare‖ (citing Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, and Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1991)).
251. Id. at 410.
252. Id. (arguing that the ―woman-protective argument conflates healthcare and choice:
[a] woman must be protected from the abortion decision because the choice is harmful to
her physical and mental health‖).
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While the medical model that bestows doctors with decisionmaking primacy over women has been largely abandoned in the context of pregnancy termination, this analysis suggests that its legacy
persists and pervades obstetric care. Margo Kaplan concluded that
Carhart‘s ―rationale can be imported into cases involving the medical
treatment of women who wish to continue their pregnancies to
term.‖253 Carhart‘s depiction of the ―state interest in fetal life and maternal health‖ is cast ―so broadly that it essentially creates new, dubious state interests that, in the context of compelled treatment cases, expand state justifications for requiring medical treatment of
pregnant women, even where such treatment would harm women‘s
health.‖254 This expanded reach of the state has problematic traction
when understood in light of the modern framings of motherhood and
parenting on which it feeds, as discussed above.
VII. RE-WRITING AND RE-RIGHTING OBSTETRIC
STANDARDS OF CARE
Reproductive rights advocates have fought for decades to achieve
women‘s autonomy in childbirth, yet successes have not been universal or fully incorporated into clinical practices.255
A. Methodological Standards of Care
To remedy the illusion of autonomy and the risks it poses to the
standard of care, tort liability is needed for the dignitary harms created by the illusion of autonomy—methodological breaches in the
standard of care. Incentive systems need to be changed in tort law to
ensure that doctors are incentivized to emphasize how a decision is
made, not just the substantive outcomes.
Doctors admit that methodological process is not prioritized. For
example, one obstetrician quoted in a survey revealed the absence of
methodological standards of care: ―I think there are some patients
who get very focused on the process, and all they care about is the
process . . . . But for me, it is the end result. Do we have a good mom
and a good baby? That‘s what you try to do.‖256 Researchers studying
medical behavior and interviewing doctors explained how clients care
about the birthing process, but doctors view their goal as ―limiting
253. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 148.
254. Id. at 145, 158 (―[Carhart] expands the ‗fetal life‘ state interest far beyond what
Roe and its progeny intended, essentially recognizing new state interests in promoting
respect for human life and protecting women from medical decisions they might regret.‖).
255. See, e.g., King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 429 (―Much has been written on how
to bring the law to bear on medical practice in order to improve patient rights and protect
physicians, but far less has been done to bring the practice of medicine to inform our legal
standards.‖).
256. SIMONDS ET AL., supra note 91, at 218.
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bad things‖ and ―achiev[ing] a good outcome.‖257 Doctors deprioritized a ―process-related orientation‖ as less important than a
―medicalized orientation‖ because the former can ―jeopardize results,
and concentrating on results justifies not attending to process.‖258 In
this medicalized framework, the ―most important accomplishment is
getting the baby out of the woman.‖259
Accordingly, methodological standards are needed to standardize
the delivery of care.260 Because tort law has such strong ―radiating
effects,‖ it is critical to clearly articulate decision-making norms that
can, in turn, directly shape and inform public discourse.261 Specifically, obstetric standards of care do not explicitly address how to resolve
conflicts deriving from the simultaneous treatment of birthing women and their fetuses. Existing models are either nonexistent or not
functional.
Informed consent only creates tort liability based on the actualization of negative outcomes, not the methodology itself. Informed consent examines whether a doctor negligently failed to disclose the nature, alternatives, risks, and consequences of a suggested treatment.262 The physician proposing treatment is required to inform the
patient about all ―material risks,‖ which include serious risks, even
those with minute chances of actually occurring.263 The traditional
standard focuses on what a reasonable medical professional would
tell patients about the nature, alternatives, risks, and consequences
of a given treatment.264 Some jurisdictions have adopted a standard in
which the test is what ―the reasonable patient would want to know.‖265

257. Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. Id. (―Doctors did not represent birth as only pathological or risky, by any means,
but they depicted it as always potentially pathological or risky. If you never know when
disaster can strike, you must always be a sentinel.‖).
259. Id. at 219, 222 (―[Within this discourse of OBs,] instrumental and operative deliveries are not conceptualized as risks to women, because risk is conceptualized as emanating from women‘s bodies gone wrong or awry, rather than from acts done to women‘s bodies
by medical professionals.‖).
260. See, e.g., Lisa Pratt, Access to Vaginal Birth After Cesarean: Restrictive Policies
and the Chilling of Women‘s Medical Rights During Childbirth, 20 WILLIAM & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 105, 121-22 (2013) (concluding that the notion that ―all that matters is a
healthy mom and healthy baby‖ does a disservice to women and babies because ―women
must be full participants in their pregnancies‖ so as not to ―compromise the manner in
which we attain the stated goal‖). ―Everyone agrees that healthy moms and healthy babies
are important, but that goal must be carried out in a manner that acknowledges that the
process is as important as the end result.‖ Id. at 122.
261. Anne Bloom, The Radiating Effects of Torts, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 229, 233-34 (2013).
262. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 195 (12th ed. 2010).
263. Id. at 196.
264. Id. at 195.
265. Id. at 196-97.

2014]

WOMEN‘S MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING

55

Modern reproductive rights arguments are being fought over the
―winner take all‖ autonomy or primacy fight. Reproductive rights advocates have championed absolute women‘s autonomy in reproductive decision-making, while opponents have argued for absolute personhood and fetal primacy.266 Analyzing the deeper social and cultural anchoring—as understood through the tort system—suggests reproductive rights advocates might be pursuing an unduly risky strategy by engaging the battle on these terms. It suggests that a methodological standard of care might be the most effective way to effectuate autonomy consistent with tort standards of care.
B. Using Decision-Making Aids
Tort standards of care should impose methodological standards of
care for how decisions are made to ensure that the patient retains
decision-making autonomy and that thoughtful, effective consultation is encouraged beyond traditional informed consent models.267 Decision-making aids should be required within the governing tort
standard of care. Interactive decision-making aids facilitate effective
decision-making and the processing of information.268
Decision aids are tools that ―collect and analyze the latest clinical
evidence regarding the risks and benefits of different treatment options and then present the information in a manner patients can understand.‖269 The process is to be collaborative with various stakeholders across various disciplines,270 including clinical researchers,
practicing physicians, health services researchers, biostatisticians,
and others, and they are regularly reviewed ―to ensure both the accuracy and integrity of the information conveyed.‖271 The decision aids
provide information on the pros and cons of each option in an unbiased manner. In addition, the aids often offer video interviews and
testimonials from patients and physicians regarding positive and
negative experiences with each outcome and explanations for limita266. ―[A]ntichoice activists have used fetal rights and mortality as their primary justification for restricting abortion . . . .‖ CARON, supra note 102, at 251.
267. See generally King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 480.
268. Id. See generally CTR. FOR PERINATAL HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, MAKING CHOICES:
OPTIONS FOR A PREGNANT WOMAN WITH A BREECH BABY: A DECISION AID FOR WOMEN (2006),
available at http://sydney.edu.au/medicine/public-health/shdg/docs/Breech_DA.pdf.
269. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 464. See generally INFORMED MED. DECISIONS
FOUND., FOUNDATION-FUNDED RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: ADVANCING OUR KNOWLEDGE OF
HOW MEDICAL DECISIONS ARE MADE (Jan. 2013), available at http://informedmedical
decisions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Research_Highlights.pdf (compiling all of the
research the grants of the Informed Medical Decisions Foundation have supported over the
last decade as they have worked to measure the problem, assess the quality of medical
decision-making, and measure decision quality).
270. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S38.
271. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 464.
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tions in evidence for one treatment over another.272 Patients are given ample time to then digest and process the information and to
make their communications with their physicians more fruitful.273
Childbirth is distinctly well-positioned for decision-making aids
because there is time to plan and prepare.274 It is also cost-effective to
create decision aids for childbirth because the decisions are repeated
so many times and so consistently. In fact, some decision aids already
exist for certain medical procedures.275
Decision aids are currently being integrated into various legislative and clinical settings.276 The Federal Affordable Care Act, for example, makes grants available to health care providers ―for the development and implementation of shared decision-making techniques
and to assess the use of such techniques.‖277 Various medical centers
in the United States have started experimenting with decisionmaking aids.278 A Washington statute also requires competent pa272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Sakala & Corry, supra note 23, at 66 (―[P]regnant women have many months
to prepare and would benefit from high-quality information and decision support relating
to labor and birth well before labor.‖).
275. See, e.g., Research Summaries for Consumers, Clinicians, and Policymakers: Pregnancy
and Childbirth, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, available at http://www.effective
healthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm/research-summaries-for-consumers-clinicians-and-policymakers/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (citing existing aids regarding the induction of labor).
276. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 465.
277. Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(e)(3)(A) (2010). See generally id. § 299b36 (stating that the purpose of this section is to ―facilitate collaborative processes between
patients, caregivers or authorized representatives, and clinicians that engages the patient,
caregiver or authorized representative in decision making, provides patients, caregivers or
authorized representatives with information about trade-offs among treatment options,
and facilitates the incorporation of patient preferences and values into the medical plan‖);
Samuel F. Hansen, The Role of Decision Aids in the Affordable Care Act, STAN. J. PUB.
HEALTH (2013), available at http://web.standford.edu/group/sjph/cgi-bin/sjphsite/the-role-ofdecision-aids-in-the-affordable-care-act/. Section 3506 of the Affordable Care Act, ―Program
to Facilitate Shared Decision-making,‖ provides standards for the developing, implementation, funding, and certification of decision aids within the national health care system.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3506, 124 Stat. 119, 527
(2010). The section facilitates decision aids by funding a third party entity which will develop standards based on medical consensus and certify patient decision-making aids for
use by federal health programs. Id. at 527-29. Patient decision aid is defined as ―an education tool that helps patients, caregivers or authorized representatives understand and
communicate their beliefs and preferences related to their treatment options and to decide
with their health care provider what treatments are best for them based on their treatment
options, scientific evidence, circumstances, beliefs and preferences.‖ Id. at 527. The aids
inform patients and their families of the benefits, risks, costs and effectiveness of tests and
treatments. See Emily Oshima Lee & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Shared Decision Making to Improve Care and Reduce Costs, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 6, 7 (2013).
278. Moulton & King, supra 113, at 91 (highlighting a Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical
Center for Shared Decision-Making); see also Informed Choice, DARTMOUTH INST.,
http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/research/engaging/informed-choice (last visited Feb. 10, 2015)
(explaining that shared decision-making is needed when there are multiple choices, each
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tients to sign written acknowledgement that she engaged in shared
decision-making with a certified decision aid.279
The process of developing decision aids would also strengthen evidence-based standards of care. They would reveal the ―critical gaps in
the evidence needed for decision making on [specific obstetric decisions], then fund and conduct targeted research with time frames
that can compare short-term and longer-term outcomes and costs.‖280
Embedding a decision-aid framework within the standard of care
by which doctors consult with their patients would help remedy the
issues described here. This is a tool to facilitate the decision outcome,
separate and distinct from informed consent, by which the doctor
presents the risks and benefits. One study considered the efficacy in
presenting a decision-aid framework to help women decide whether
to have a subsequent caesarean birth after a prior cesarean delivery.281 The study concluded that such a tool was useful in helping
women consider the risks and benefits of delivery options, and it improved the extent to which they felt informed, but it did not improve
their relationships with their health care provider.282 High-quality
decisions come from ―a strategy of ‗vigilance‘, where the decisionmaker searches for information that is relevant to the decision, assimilates information in an unbiased manner and then appraises the
alternatives before making a choice.‖283 A workable decision-making
framework would need to acknowledge individual habits that skew
toward ―unquestioned acceptance, responsibility shifting, rationalisation, bolstering of the least stressful alternative and inattention to
additional information that would involve change.‖284 Framing a decision-making model would account for the real-world realities of decisionmaking in the context of time and environmental constraints, such as
family or social commitments, relationships, and risk averseness.285

with its own advantages and disadvantages, none of which is a clear ―correct‖ choice, but
rather the ―correct‖ choice depends on individual factors and values).
279. Moulton & King, supra 113, at 92.
280. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S38.
281. Allison Shorten et al., Preparing Consumers for Shared Decisions: Analyzing the
Effectiveness of a Decision-Aid for Women Making Choices About Birth After Caesarean, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE 73 (Elizabeth P. Blakely ed., 2007)
(studying 227 women). This is a complicated decision because both options are considered
―safe‖ for most women, and both options involve some degree of risk for the mother and the
baby. Id. at 78. The risk of uterine rupture is relatively small, less than one-half percent,
but the consequences of the risk occurring are huge—hysterectomy or fetal death. Id.
282. Id. at 93-94.
283. Id. at 76.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 77, 79.
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Decision aids better perpetuate a model of autonomy. They allow
the patient to ―make an autonomous choice to participate in a full or
limited way or not at all in making the final decision after receiving
the relevant information.‖286 Thus, patients can elect to defer fully to
medical judgment in ways that remain consistent with autonomy, but
it is not per se the standard of care that they have to do so.287 In that
sense, the aids are beneficial to doctors and patients alike. For doctors, decision aids would better address the accountability fears of
medical practitioners who perceive conflicts between tort liability for
bad fetal outcomes in obstetric care and actualizing women‘s autonomy. Including a decision-making framework in the standard of care
would better protect doctors when bad fetal outcomes occur and better protect women‘s autonomy in the cases where women deviate
from normalized mainstream decision-making methodologies.
Decision-making aids can be an effective tool to deter the cognitive
bias created by the experiences of most women and most doctors in
tort law. Cognitive bias researchers describe that several mechanisms can reduce or eliminate the problems of cognitive bias. The replacement of human intuition—the origin of cognitive bias—with
formal procedures can strengthen decision-making frameworks.288
Many decision-makers lack appropriate ―codes‖ to detect bias. However, this can be remedied by external calibrations.289 Researchers
generally believe that it is possible to ―debias‖ a problem; subjects
when faced with ―falsifying evidence . . . generally did reject their hypotheses . . . and respond accordingly,‖ ―suggest[ing] that subjects
may be passive rather than active.‖290 In that sense, decision aids can
also be a highly effective response to race, class, and ethnic differences in child care decision-making.291
Yet the aids themselves need to be managed for risks of bias,
which, of course, is extremely sensitive within the history of the
state‘s problematic regulation of informed consent in abortion.292 To

286. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 436.
287. Id.
288. JONATHAN ST. B.T. EVANS, BIAS IN HUMAN REASONING: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 114-15 (1989) (explaining the general belief that critical thinking is a skill
that can be taught, yet expressing skepticism regarding this accepted conclusion).
289. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1129-30 (1974).
290. EVANS, supra note 288, at 49-50 (noting, however, that the de-biasing mechanisms
need to be more interactive than just instructions to decision-makers).
291. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S30.
292. Moulton & King, supra note 113, at 92 (describing a tension with how states have
managed abortion informed consent and proposing resolution through effective certification
procedures).
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ensure that materials are unbiased, proper certification from neutral
bodies is required.293
Decision aids are also uniquely time and resource intensive to
prepare as a tool.294 They are further burdensome on physicians to
implement.295 Yet they can achieve critical improvements in ―patient
comprehension‖ and ―decisional conflict,‖ and they can also achieve
some ―improved health outcomes.‖296
Successful implementation of decision aids requires compulsion
through a tort-based standard of care. Absent a clear standard of
care requiring such methodological precision, doctors lack the incentives and tools to implement.297 The standard of care would need to
explicitly protect doctors who follow careful methodological decisionmaking from later litigation. For example, the Washington State bill
treats the signed acknowledgment of shared decision-making with the
use of a decision aid as prima facie evidence of informed consent.298
VIII. CONCLUSION
The complexities of obstetric care where dual duties are owed to
both the fetus and the birthing women suggest that there should be
more conflict in obstetric care. Many women and their doctors resolve
this complexity by deploying a decision-making model to minimize all
fetal risks. This standard is unworkable and intolerable because it
perpetuates a mere illusion of women‘s autonomy. The deference to
medical determinations of fetal risks further resurrects the ghost of
Roe v. Wade‘s medical model. It grossly deviates from baseline standards of care by exaggerating the severity of fetal risks and undervaluing even unreasonable risks to the birthing women. Cognitive bias
further entrenches this implicit model and exacerbates it along class,
race, and ethnic lines. Tort law should care about the methodology of
decision-making, just as it cares about the substance. Furthermore, it
should be used to create/install the methodology by which women can
regain/establish their actual autonomy over medical decision-making.

293. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 466.
294. Id.
295. Moulton & King, supra note 113, at 90 (explaining how it has been challenging to
integrate decision aids in practice because of administrative challenges and a lack of financial and legal incentives).
296. Id.
297. See id. at 92.
298. Id. Washington State positions shared decision-making as ―an alternative means
of meeting the informed consent requirement set forth by laws . . . .‖ WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.70.060(2)(a) (2012).
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